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The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	   is	  to	  provide	  a	  new	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  roles	  of	  court	  
presidents	   in	   judicial	   governance	   in	   Europe.	   It	   argues	   that	   in	  order	   to	  better	  understand	  
the	   role	   of	   court	   presidents	   in	   comparative	   perspective	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   unpack	   their	  
power	   into	   smaller	   components	   that	   can	   be	   analyzed	   separately.	  We	   define	   seven	   such	  
components:	   judicial	   career,	   jurisprudential,	   administrative,	   financial,	   ambassadorial,	   and	  
media	  power,	  and	  ancillary	  powers	  as	  a	  residual	  category.	  Subsequently,	  we	  zero	  in	  on	  13	  
European	   jurisdictions	  and	  rate	   them	  according	   to	   the	  strength	  of	   their	  court	  presidents’	  
powers.	  By	  doing	  so	  we	  are	  developing	  a	  Court	  President	  Power	  Index.	  Based	  on	  this	  Index	  
we	  question	  the	  claim	  that	  Western	  court	  presidents	  are	  always	  weaker	  than	  their	  Eastern	  
European	   counterparts	   and	   argue	   that	   powers	   of	   court	   presidents	   diverge	   both	   within	  
Western	  Europe	  and	  within	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  hence	  it	   is	  difficult	  to	  draw	  the	  easy	  line	  
along	   the	   West/East	   axis	   on	   this	   ground.	   Finally,	   we	   problematize	   our	   Court	   President	  
Power	  Index	  and	  show	  that	  powers	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  faculty	  do	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  
into	   influence	   since	   various	   contingent	   circumstances	   (such	   as	   the	   length	   of	   court	  
presidents’	   terms	   of	   office,	   information	   asymmetry,	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   the	  
existence	   of	   competing	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	   bodies,	   the	   role	   of	   individuals,	   the	  
proximity	  of	  court	  presidents	  to	  political	  leaders,	  the	  legal	  profession,	  legal	  culture,	  and	  the	  
political	  environment)	  affect	   to	  what	  extent	  court	  presidents	  may	  exploit	   their	  powers	   in	  
practice.	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When	   Viktor	   Orbán’s	   regime	   ousted	   the	   sitting	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Hungarian	   Supreme	  
Court,	  András	  Baka,1	  who	  dared	   to	  criticize	   the	   judicial	   reforms	  adopted	  by	  Fidesz,	  many	  
stakeholders	  were	  appalled.	  Most	  of	  them	  did	  not	  even	  notice	  that	  Orbán	  also	  got	  rid	  of	  
the	   Supreme	   Court	   Vice-­‐President	   (by	   statutory	   amendment)2	   and	   many	   lower	   court	  
presidents	  (by	  reducing	  the	  compulsory	  retirement	  age	  for	  judges).3	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  the	  
Law	  and	  Justice	  Government	  in	  Poland	  followed	  this	  script.	  Kaczyński	  gave	  his	  Minister	  of	  
Justice	   Zbigniew	   Ziobro	   a	   six-­‐month	   window,	   which	   allowed	   Ziobro	   to	   dismiss	   court	  
presidents	  and	  appoint	  new	  ones	  without	  consultation.	  Ziobro	  fully	  exploited	  this	  “window	  
of	   opportunity”	   to	   replace	   almost	   150	   court	   presidents	   and	   vice	   presidents.4	   Law	   and	  
Justice	  also	  reduced	  the	  compulsory	  retirement	  age	  for	  judges	  from	  70	  to	  65	  years,	  which	  
“by	   accident”	   applied	   also	   to	   the	   Polish	   Supreme	   Court	   President,	  Małgorzata	   Gersdorf,	  
who	  turned	  65	  in	  2017	  and	  whose	  constitutional	  term	  of	  office	  was	  supposed	  to	  end	  only	  
in	  2020.5	  
	  
However,	   this	   is	   just	   the	   tip	   of	   the	   iceberg.6	   In	   fact,	   political	   leaders	   in	   the	   CEE	   region	  
dismissed	   (or	   attempted	   to	   dismiss)	   not	   only	  András	  Baka	   and	  Małgorzata	  Gersdorf,	   but	  
also	   Supreme	   Court	   Chief	   Justices	   in	   Croatia7	   and	   Czechia,8	   and	   court	   presidents	   in	  
Slovakia.9	  Most	  recently,	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  the	  Bulgarian	  Chief	  Justice	  is	  under	  pressure	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from	  the	  Chief	  Prosecutor.10	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  lower	  court	  presidents,	  their	  discretionary	  
dismissals	  also	  were11	  or	  have	  been12	  a	  common	  practice	  in	  the	  region.	  For	  instance,	  each	  
Slovak	  minister	  of	  justice	  since	  1998	  who	  has	  remained	  in	  office	  for	  two	  or	  more	  years	  has	  
replaced	  more	  than	  25%	  of	  all	  court	  presidents.13	  Three	  of	  them	  replaced	  more	  than	  50%	  
of	  court	  presidents,14	  which	   is	  much	  more	  than	  Law	  and	  Justice	   in	  Poland	  within	   the	   last	  
three	  years.	  A	   similar	  practice	   flourishes	   in	  Ukraine,	  where	   ‘recalcitrant’	   court	  presidents	  
have	  often	  faced	  reprisals,	  both	  before15	  and	  after16	  the	  Euromaidan.	  
	  
These	  controversial	  moves	  drew	  significant	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  court	  presidents	  in	  CEE	  
judiciaries.	   What	   powers	   do	   the	   CEE	   court	   presidents	   have	   if	   it	   is	   so	   important	   to	   the	  
political	   leaders	  to	  install	  their	  own	  people	  in	  these	  positions?	  Put	  differently,	  there	  must	  
be	  something	  special	  about	  their	  role	  within	  the	  court	  administration.	  Otherwise,	  political	  
leaders	  would	  not	  care	  so	  much	  about	  them.	  Several	  scholars	  showed	  what	  broad	  powers	  
some	   court	   presidents	   in	   CEE	   wield,17	   which	   may	   in	   turn	   explain	   why	   the	   CEE	   political	  
leaders	  pay	  so	  much	  attention	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  court	  presidents	  and	  are	  even	  willing	  to	  
dismiss	   incumbent	  court	  presidents,	  despite	  heavy	  political	  costs	  on	  the	  domestic	  as	  well	  
as	  international	  level.18	  	  
	  
One	   may	   object	   that	   replacing	   incumbent	   court	   presidents	   by	   judges	   loyal	   to	   the	   new	  
populist	  regime	  has	  little	  bearing	  on	  the	  greater	  scheme	  of	  things,	  especially	  in	  comparison	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to	   attacks	   on	   constitutional	   courts,	   court-­‐packing	   strategies,	  weakening	   judicial	   councils,	  
and	   capturing	   the	   process	   of	   selection	   of	   judges.	   However,	   as	   shown	   above,	   populist	  
political	   leaders	   in	   Hungary,	   Poland,	   and	   other	   CEE	   countries	   care	   about	   the	   control	   of	  
court	  presidents.	  They	  care	  about	  court	  presidents,	  because	  they	  know	  that	  it	  is	  a	  powerful	  
channel	  of	  politicization	  and	  taming	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  They	  might	  favor	  this	  channel	  also	  for	  
other	   reasons	  –	  because	   it	   is	   less	  visible	  and	  more	  difficult	   to	   fight,	  because	   it	  allows	   for	  
continual	  control	  of	  the	  judiciary	  (in	  contrast	  to	  single	  acts	  such	  as	  selection	  or	  promotion),	  
or	   because	   loyal	   court	   presidents	  may	   serve	   as	   a	   valuable	   source	   of	   information	   for	   the	  
political	   leaders	  about	  what	   is	  going	  on	  within	   the	   judiciary,	  which	   in	   turn	  helps	   them	  to	  
suppress	  the	  potential	   revolt	  of	   judges	   from	  the	  outset.19	  We	  should	  thus	  care	  as	  well.	   If	  
we	  want	  to	  prevent	  (or	  at	  least	  slow	  down)	  the	  capture	  of	  the	  judiciary	  by	  populist	  leaders,	  
we	  need	  to	  know	  what	  CEE	  court	  presidents	  do,	  who	  they	  are,	  what	  are	  their	  motivations,	  
why	  CEE	  political	  leaders	  replace	  them,	  and	  what	  the	  potential	  channels	  of	  politicization	  of	  
the	  judiciary	  via	  court	  presidents	  are.	  
	  
However,	   the	   selection	  of	   court	  presidents	  has	  become	   increasingly	   controversial	   also	   in	  
Western	   Europe.	   As	   early	   as	   in	   1997,	   the	   Prince	   of	   Liechtenstein’s	   refusal	   to	   reappoint	  
sitting	   president	   Wille	   for	   yet	   another	   term	   as	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Liechtenstein	  
Administrative	   Court	   due	   to	   Mr.	   Wille’s	   public	   statements	   regarding	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
Prince’s	  power	  caused	  an	  outcry	   that	  eventually	  ended	  up	  before	   the	  Grand	  Chamber	  of	  
the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.20	  Even	  in	  Norway,	  where	  judicial	  politics	  have	  rarely	  
been	  discussed	  in	  public,	  the	  most	  recent	  appointment	  to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  
drew	  severe	  criticism	  from	  the	  political	  opposition,	  scholars	  as	  well	  as	  the	  insiders.21	  
	  
Beyond	  Europe,	   some	  of	   the	   stories	   regarding	   court	  presidents	   are	  even	  more	  dramatic.	  
When	  the	  Pakistani	  President	  suspended	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Pakistan,	  Iftikhar	  Muhammad	  
Chaudhry,	  in	  2007,	  it	  caused	  a	  nationwide	  popular	  mass	  protest	  movement	  led	  by	  lawyers	  
who	   eventually	   succeeded	   in	   getting	   Mr.	   Chaudhry	   reinstated	   to	   the	   office	   of	   Chief	  
Justice.22	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Peru23	  and	  Indonesia,24	  chief	  justices	  had	  to	  resign	  amid	  corruption	  
                                            
19	  See	  also	  notes	  255-­‐257	  below.	  
20	  Wille	  v.	  Liechtenstein,	  EUR.	  CT.	  H.	  R.	  (Judgment	  of	  the	  Grand	  Chamber	  of	  28	  October	  1999,	  app.	  no.	  28396/95).	  
21	   Anine	   Kierulf,	   Norway:	   New	   Chief	   Justice	   Appointed	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   I-­‐CONNECT	   (March	   1,	   2016),	  
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/03/norway-­‐new-­‐chief-­‐justice/.	  
22	   See	   Ilyas	   Khan,	   Judge	   row	   prompts	   Pakistan	   democracy	   questions,	   BBC	   NEWS	   (March	   12,	   2007),	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6442829.stm;	   and	   Pakistan’s	   top	   judge	   reinstated,	   BBC	   NEWS	   (July	   20,	  
2007),	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6907685.stm.	  For	  more	  details,	  see	  Shoaib	  A.	  Ghias,	  Miscarriage	  of	  
Chief	   Justice:	   Judicial	   Power	   and	   the	   Legal	   Complex	   in	   Pakistan	   under	  Musharraf,	  35	   LAW	  &	   SOCIAL	   INQUIRY	   985	  
(2010).	  	  
23	   See	   Peru	   political	   turmoil:	   Supreme	   court	   president	   resigns	   over	   tapes	   scandal,	   BBC	   NEWS	   (July	   19,	   2018),	  
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐latin-­‐america-­‐44892884.	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scandals.	   In	  all	  three	  countries,	  these	  events	  led	  to	  constitutional	  crises.	  Even	  established	  
democracies	   are	   not	   spared	   such	   dramas,	   as	   the	   Tim	   Carmody	   affair	   attests.	  When	   Tim	  
Carmody	  was	  appointed	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Queensland	  by	  Premier	  Campbell	  Newman	  in	  
2014,	   it	   tore	   the	  Australian	   legal	  profession	  apart	  and	  eventually	  evolved	   into	  Australia’s	  
greatest	  judicial	  crisis.25	  
	  
The	  role	  of	  court	  presidents	  became	  more	  visible	  at	  international	  and	  supranational	  courts	  
too.	   For	   instance,	   some	  actions	  of	   the	  President	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  of	   the	  European	  
Union,	   Vassilios	   Skouris,	   who	   presided	   over	   the	   CJEU	   from	   2003	   to	   2015,	   became	   the	  
subject	  of	  scholarly	  criticism.	  First,	  the	  manner	  of	  his	  involvement	  in	  the	  judicial	  reform	  of	  
the	   CJEU	   and	   the	   subsequent	   lobbying	   for	   it	   raised	   serious	   concerns.26	   Second,	   Skouris’	  
actions	  within	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   itself	  caused	  a	  split	  between	  him	  and	  the	  President	  of	  
the	   General	   Court,	   Marc	   Jaeger.27	   No	   controversy	   on	   such	   a	   scale	   has	   reached	   the	  
Strasbourg	  Court	  so	  far,	  but	  even	  within	  the	  Strasbourg	  community,	  everybody	  knows	  how	  
important	  the	  ECtHR	  President	  is.	  For	  instance,	  both	  Luzius	  Wildhaber	  and	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Costa	  
acted	   as	   judicial	   diplomats,	   and	   the	   latter	   played	   a	   pivotal	   role	   in	   persuading	   Russia	   to	  
ratify	  Protocol	  No.	  14	  to	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights.28	  After	  the	  election	  of	  
Sir	  Nicholas	  Bratza	   to	   the	  post	  of	   the	  ECtHR	  President,	  many	   insiders	  suggested	   that	   this	  
move	  was	  motivated	  by	   the	  need	  to	  appease	   the	   increasingly	  critical	  Government	  of	   the	  
United	  Kingdom.	  The	  growing	   role	  of	  new	   internal	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	  bodies	  within	  
the	  ECtHR,	  such	  as	  the	  Bureau,29	  makes	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  ECtHR’s	  president	  even	  more	  
important.	  
	  
Given	  this	  ample	  evidence	  of	  how	  important	  court	  presidents	  are	  in	  running	  the	  judiciaries,	  
there	  is	  surprisingly	  little	  written	  on	  this	  topic.30	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  article	  is	  to	  reduce	  this	  gap	  
                                                                                                                
24	  See,	  e.g.,	  Joe	  Cochrane,	  Top	  Indonesian	  Judge	  Held	  in	  Corruption	  Case,	  THE	  NEW	  YORK	  TIMES	  (October	  3,	  2013),	  
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/asia/indonesias-­‐top-­‐judge-­‐held-­‐in-­‐corruption-­‐case.html;	   and	   Ex-­‐
head	   of	   Indonesia’s	   constitutional	   court	   jailed	   for	   life	   for	   graft,	   REUTERS	   (June	   30,	   2014),	  
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­‐indonesia-­‐corruption/ex-­‐head-­‐of-­‐indonesias-­‐constitutional-­‐court-­‐jailed-­‐for-­‐life-­‐
for-­‐graft-­‐idUKKBN0F51Z420140630.	  	  
25	   See	   REBECCA	   ANANIAN-­‐WELSH,	   GABRIELLE	   APPLEBY	   &	   ANDREW	   LYNCH,	   THE	   TIM	   CARMODY	   AFFAIR:	   AUSTRALIA’S	   GREATEST	  
JUDICIAL	  CRISIS	  (2016).	  
26	  Christoph	  Krenn,	  Governing	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice:	  Self-­‐governance	  as	  a	  Model	  for	  Success,	  in	  this	  issue.	  	  
27	  See	  Duncan	  Robinson,	  The	  1st	  rule	  of	  ECJ	  fight	  club…is	  about	  to	  be	  broken,	  FINANCIAL	  TIMES:	  BRUSSELS	  BLOG	  (April	  
27,	  2015),	  http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2015/04/27/the-­‐1st-­‐rule-­‐of-­‐ecj-­‐flight-­‐club-­‐is-­‐about-­‐to-­‐be-­‐broken.	  
28	  See	  Jennifer	  W.	  Reis,	  Protocol	  No.	  14	  ECHR	  and	  Russian	  No.	  14:	  The	  Current	  State	  of	  Affairs,	  22	  HARVARD	  HUMAN	  
RIGHTS	  JOURNAL	  293	  (2009).	  
29	  See	  Başak	  Çalı	  &	  Stewart	  Cunningham,	  Judicial	  Self	  Government	  and	  the	  sui	  generis	  case	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  
of	  Human	  Rights,	  in	  this	  issue.	  
30	  For	  more	  details,	  see	  Part	  A.	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and	  to	  provide	  a	  new	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  roles	  of	  court	  presidents	  in	  judicial	  
governance	  in	  Europe.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  we	  identify	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  and	  then	  
conduct	  a	  multiple-­‐country	  comparison,	  which	  results	  in	  the	  Court	  Presidents	  Power	  Index.	  
By	   doing	   so,	   we	   make	   the	   following	   contributions	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   court	  
administration	   and	   judicial	   studies	   more	   generally.	   First,	   we	   provide	   the	   first	  
comprehensive	   typology	   of	   powers	   of	   court	   presidents	   that	   is	   divorced	   from	   the	  
peculiarities	   of	   a	   single	   jurisdiction	   and	   allows	   for	   a	   comparison	   within	   and	   across	  
jurisdictions.	   Second,	   we	   challenge	   the	   conventional	   wisdom31	   that	   there	   is	   a	   clear	  
West/East	  division	  regarding	  the	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  in	  Europe.	  Third,	  our	  approach	  
is	   also	   novel	   in	   that	   we	   study	   transnational	   courts	   and	   domestic	   courts	   together.	   We	  
believe	   that	   both	   theoretically	   and	   empirically	   there	   is	   much	   to	   gain	   from	   comparisons	  
between	   these	   two	   levels.	   Therefore,	  we	   zero	   in	   not	   only	   on	   domestic	   court	   presidents	  
within	  Europe,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  role	  of	  presidents	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  
	  
More	  specifically,	  we	  argue	  that	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  court	  presidents	  
in	  comparative	  perspective	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  unpack	  their	  power	  into	  smaller	  components	  
that	   can	  be	  analyzed	   separately.	  We	  define	   seven	   such	   components:	  power	  over	   judicial	  
careers,	   jurisprudential	   power,	   administrative	   power,	   financial	   power,	   ambassadorial	  
power,	   media	   power,	   and	   the	   residual	   category	   of	   ancillary	   powers.	   Regarding	   the	  
abovementioned	   West/East	   division,	   we	   argue	   that	   powers	   of	   court	   presidents	   diverge	  
both	  within	  Western	  Europe	  and	  within	   Eastern	  Europe	  and	   thus	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  draw	  a	  
simple	   line	   along	   the	  West/East	   axis	   on	   this	   ground.	   When	   we	   add	   both	   supranational	  
European	   courts	   to	   the	   picture,	   it	   becomes	   even	   clearer	   that	   there	   is	   no	   consensus	   in	  
Europe	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  court	  presidents.	  	  
	  
This	  article	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  Part	  A	  summarizes	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  and	  shows	  that	  we	  
still	  know	   little	  about	  court	  presidents.	  Part	  B	   introduces	  a	  novel	   taxonomy	  of	  powers	  of	  
court	   presidents.	   In	  doing	   so,	   it	   zeroes	   in	  on	  both	   the	  de	   iure	   and	  de	   facto	  powers	   and,	  
given	   the	   scarcity	   of	   the	   relevant	   literature,	   uses	   examples	   not	   only	   from	   the	   European	  
jurisdictions	  covered	  by	  this	  special	  issue,	  but	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  Part	  C	  then	  focuses	  
on	   the	   selected	  European	   jurisdictions	  and	   rates	   them	  according	   to	   the	   strength	  of	   their	  
court	   presidents’	   powers.	   This	   rating	   results	   in	   the	   Court	   Presidents	   Power	   Index.	  
Subsequently,	  we	  identify	  five	  types	  of	  court	  presidents	  and	  revisit	  the	  view	  that	  there	  are	  
sharp	   differences	   between	   the	   roles	   of	   court	   presidents	   in	   the	  West	   Europe	   on	   the	   one	  
hand	   and	   the	   Eastern	   Europe	   on	   the	   other.	   Part	   D	   problematizes	   the	   Court	   Presidents	  
Power	   Index	   and	   shows	  what	   contingent	   circumstances	  may	   affect	   to	  what	   extent	   court	  
presidents	  can	  exploit	  their	  powers	  in	  practice.	  Part	  E	  concludes.	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  See	  Part	  D	  of	  this	  article.	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A.	  What	  do	  We	  Know	  about	  the	  Court	  Presidents?:	  Summarizing	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Art	  
	  
It	   is	   the	  most	  visible	   institutions,	  such	  as	   judicial	  councils	  or	   judicial	  appointment	  boards,	  
that	  are	  the	  usual	  subject	  of	   judicial	  self-­‐governance	  (JSG)	  studies.32	  This	   is	  caused	  by	  the	  
tendency	  to	  squeeze	  all	  forms	  of	  judicial	  self-­‐governance	  into	  the	  existing	  models	  of	  court	  
administration.	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  other	  JSG	  bodies.33	  The	  court	  presidents	  are	  one	  
of	   them.	  Apart	   from	  the	  Chief	   Justice	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	   the	  United	  States,34	  court	  
presidents	   in	   other	   jurisdictions	   (and	   even	   court	   presidents	   of	   other	   federal	   and	   state	  
courts	  in	  the	  United	  States)	  receive	  significantly	  less	  attention	  than	  judicial	  councils	  and,	  if	  
they	   do,	   it	   is	   usually	   only	   in	   connection	   with	   other,	   bigger	   issues,	   such	   as	   judicial	  
independence,	  rather	  than	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  inquiry.	  	  
	  
This	   is	   surprising,	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   historically,	   in	   many	   countries	   characterized	   by	  
bureaucratic-­‐type	   judiciaries,	   court	   presidents	   used	   to	   and	   often	   continue	   to	   play	   an	  
important	  role.	  This	  is	  so	  especially	  in	  the	  CEE	  countries	  with	  the	  Austro-­‐German	  heritage	  
of	   administration	   of	   courts	   where	   court	   presidents	   are	   especially	   powerful	   and	   enjoy	   a	  
peculiar	  status	  as	  both	   judges	  and	  administrators.35	  Such	  position	  makes	  them	  significant	  
players	   in	   so	  many	  areas	   that	  we	  could	  even	   say	   they	   influence	  not	  only	   judges’	   careers	  
right	   from	   the	   beginning	   to	   the	   very	   end,	   be	   it	   in	   their	   selection	   and	   appointment,	  
                                            
32	  For	  a	  thorough	  introduction,	  see	  David	  Kosař,	  Beyond	  Judicial	  Councils:	  Forms,	  Rationales	  and	  Impact	  of	  Judicial	  
Self-­‐Government	  in	  Europe,	  in	  this	  issue.	  
33	  We	  define	  JSG	  body	  as	  a	  body	  with	  at	  least	  one	  judge	  whose	  primary	  function,	  entrenched	  in	  a	  legal	  norm,	  is	  to	  
decide	  about	  issues	  regarding	  court	  administration	  and/or	  the	  career	  of	  a	  judge,	  and/or	  advise	  those	  who	  decide	  
about	  such	  issues.	  See	  also	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  32.	  
34	  DAVID	  J.	  DANELSKI,	  A	  SUPREME	  COURT	  JUSTICE	  IS	  APPOINTED	  (1964);	  Sandra	  L.	  Wood,	  Linda	  C.	  Keith,	  Drew	  N.	  Lanier	  &	  
Ayo	  Ogundele,	  Opinion	  Assignment	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  81	  SOCIAL	  SCIENCE	  QUARTERLY	  798	  (2000);	  Todd	  E.	  Pettys,	  
Choosing	  a	  Chief	  Justice:	  Presidential	  Prerogative	  Or	  a	  Job	  for	  the	  Court?,	  22	  J.	  OF	  L.	  &	  POLITICS	  231	  (2006);	  Joel	  K.	  
Goldstein,	   Leading	   the	   Court:	   Studies	   in	   Influence	   as	   Chief	   Justice,	   40	   STETSON	   LAW	  REVIEW	   717	   (2011);	   Drew	  N.	  
Lanier,	  Acclimation	  Effects	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice:	  The	  Influence	  of	  Tenure	  on	  the	  Decisional	  Behavior	  of	  the	  Court’s	  
Leader,	  1888–2007,	  39	  AMERICAN	  POLITICS	  RESEARCH	  682	  (2011);	  DAVID	  J.	  DANELSKI	  &	  ARTEMUS	  WARD,	  THE	  CHIEF	  JUSTICE:	  
APPOINTMENT	   AND	   INFLUENCE	   (2016);	   Forrest	   Maltzman	   &	   Paul	   J.	   Wahlbeck,	   May	   It	   Please	   the	   Chief?	   Opinion	  
Assignments	  in	  the	  Rehnquist	  Court,	  40	  AMERICAN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  421	  (1996);	  Forrest	  Maltzman	  &	  Paul	  
J.	  Wahlbeck,	  A	  Conditional	  Model	  of	  Opinion	  Assignment	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  57	  POLITICAL	  RESEARCH	  QUARTERLY	  
551	  (2004);	  Paul	  J.	  Wahlbeck,	  Strategy	  and	  Constraints	  on	  Supreme	  Court	  Opinion	  Assignment,	  154	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  
PENNSYLVANIA	  LAW	  REVIEW	  1729	  (2006);	  G.	  Edward	  White,	  The	  Internal	  Powers	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice:	  The	  Nineteenth-­‐
Century	   Legacy,	   154	  UNIVERSITY	   OF	   PENNSYLVANIA	   LAW	   REVIEW	   1463	   (2006);	   Jeffrey	   R.	   Lax	  &	   Charles	  M.	   Cameron,	  
Bargaining	  and	  Opinion	  Assignment	  on	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court,	  23	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LAW,	  ECONOMICS	  &	  ORGANIZATION	  276	  
(2007);	  see	  also	  the	  biographies	  of	  Chief	  Justices,	  e.	  g.	  KENNETH	  BERNARD	  UMBREIT,	  OUR	  ELEVEN	  CHIEF	  JUSTICES	  (1938);	  
Abe	  Fortas,	  Chief	  Justice	  Warren:	  The	  Enigma	  of	  Leadership,	  84	  YALE	  L.	  J.	  405	  (1975);	  HERBERT	  A.	  JOHNSON,	  THE	  CHIEF	  
JUSTICESHIP	  OF	  JOHN	  MARSHALL,	  1801–1835	  (1997);	  EARL	  M.	  MALTZ,	  THE	  CHIEF	  JUSTICESHIP	  OF	  WARREN	  BURGER,	  1969–1986	  
(2000);	  and	  R.	  KENT	  NEWMYER,	  THE	  SUPREME	  COURT	  UNDER	  MARSHALL	  AND	  TANEY	  (2005).	  	  
35	  Bobek,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  251,	  252–254.	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evaluation,	  promotion	  and	  reassignment,36	  and	  in	  holding	  them	  to	  account,37	  but	  also	  their	  
day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  by	  creating	  work	  schedules38	  and	  assigning	  cases,39	  or	  controlling	  parts	  of	  
salaries40	  and	  discretionary	  perks.41	  
	  
Looking	   into	   the	   powers	   of	   CEE	   countries’	   court	   presidents	   and	   the	   power	   relations	  
between	   them	  and	  other	  branches	  of	  power,	  we	  see	   that	   they	  can	   take	  up	   the	   role	  of	  a	  
principal	   JSG	   actor.42	   Such	   vast	   power	   of	   court	   presidents	   is	   understandably	   not	   at	   all	  
unproblematic	   as,	   coupled	  with	   a	   strong	   position	   in	   another	   JSG	   body	   such	   as	   a	   judicial	  
council,	   it	   could	   lead	   to	   abuse	   and	   accountability	   perversions.43	   The	   court	   presidents’	  
importance	  is	  by	  no	  means	  limited	  to	  the	  CEE	  countries	  –	  influential	  court	  presidents	  exist	  
also	   in	  Latin	  America,44	  the	  United	  States45	  or	  Asian	  countries.46	  An	  extensive	   literature	   is	  
                                            
36	   A	   very	   rich	   source	   of	   information	   on	   court	   presidents	   not	   only	   in	   CEE	   countries,	   but	   also	   in	   some	   of	   the	  
developed	  western	  democracies,	  are	  the	  national	  reports	  in	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  IN	  TRANSITION	  (Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr	  
ed.,	  2012);	  especially	  by	  Adam	  Bodnar	  and	  Łukasz	  Bojarski	  on	  Poland	  at	  667,	  by	  Zoltán	  Fleck	  on	  Hungary	  at	  793,	  
by	  Ramona	  Coman	  and	  Cristina	  Dallara	  on	  Romania	  at	  835,	  by	  Olga	  Schwartz	  and	  Elga	  Sykiainen	  on	  Russia	  at	  971.	  
37	  DANIELA	  PIANA,	   JUDICIAL	  ACCOUNTABILITIES	   IN	  NEW	  EUROPE:	  FROM	  RULE	  OF	  LAW	  TO	  QUALITY	  OF	   JUSTICE	  43–4	  (2010);	  see	  
also	  David	  Kosař,	  The	  Least	  Accountable	  Branch,	  11	  INT’L	  J.	  OF	  CONST.	  LAW	  234	  (2013)	  setting	  straight	  some	  claims	  
that	  Daniela	  Piana	  makes	  in	  her	  book.	  
38	  Giuseppe	  Di	  Federico,	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  Italy,	  in	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  357,	  378–379.	  
39	  Schwartz	  &	  Sykiainen,	  supra	  note	  36,	  at	  1019–1021.	  
40	  This	  was	  the	  case	  of	  Slovakia,	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  279–280.	  
41	   Peter	  H.	   Solomon,	  Authoritarian	   legality	   and	   informal	   practices:	   Judges,	   lawyers	   and	   the	   state	   in	   Russia	   and	  
China,	  43	  COMMUNIST	  AND	  POST-­‐COMMUNIST	  STUDIES	  351,	  354	  (2010);	  see	  also	  Peter	  H.	  Solomon,	  The	  Accountability	  
of	  Judges	  in	  Post	  Communist	  States:	  From	  Bureaucratic	  to	  Professional	  Accountability,	  in	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  
17,	  at	  909.	  On	   judicial	   government	   in	  post-­‐Soviet	   countries,	  see	   also	  Popova,	  supra	   note	  17;	  and	  Müller,	  supra	  
note	  17,	  at	  937.	  
42	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  11.	  
43	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  68–72.	  
44	  Alexei	  Trochev	  &	  Rachel	  Ellett,	  Judges	  and	  Their	  Allies:	  Rethinking	  Judicial	  Autonomy	  Through	  the	  Prism	  of	  Off-­‐
Bench	  Resistance,	  2	   J.	  OF	   L.	  AND	  COURTS	  67	   (2014);	  MATTHEW	  C.	   INGRAM,	  CRAFTING	  COURTS	   IN	  NEW	  DEMOCRACIES:	  THE	  
POLITICS	   OF	   SUBNATIONAL	   JUDICIAL	   REFORM	   IN	   BRAZIL	   AND	   MEXICO	   (Cambridge	   University	   Press	   2015);	   Matthew	   C.	  
Ingram,	  Networked	  Justice:	  Judges,	  the	  Diffusion	  of	  Ideas,	  and	  Legal	  Reform	  Movements	  in	  Mexico,	  48	  J.	  LAT.	  AMER.	  
STUD.	   739	   (2016);	   Andrea	   Pozas-­‐Loyo	   &	   Julio	   Ríos-­‐Figueroa,	   The	   Transformations	   of	   the	   Role	   of	   the	   Mexican	  
Supreme	   Court,	   In	   JUDICIAL	   POLITICS	   IN	   MEXICO:	   THE	   SUPREME	   COURT	   AND	   THE	   TRANSITION	   TO	   DEMOCRACY	   (Andrea	  
Castagnola	  &	  Saúl	  López	  Noriega	  eds.,	  2016),	  at	  8;	  Björn	  Dressel,	  Raul	  Sanchez-­‐Urribarri	  &	  Alexander	  Stroh,	  The	  
Informal	  Dimension	  of	  Judicial	  Politics:	  A	  Relational	  Perspective,	  13	  ANNUAL	  REVIEW	  OF	  LAW	  AND	  SOCIAL	  SCIENCE	  413	  
(2017);	  and	   the	  special	   issue	  on	   ‘Courts	  and	   Informal	  Networks’	   in	  Volume	  39(5)	   INTERNATIONAL	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  
REVIEW	  (2018).	  
45	  James	  E.	  Pfander,	  The	  Chief	  Justice,	  the	  Appointment	  of	  Inferior	  Officers,	  and	  the	  “Court	  of	  Law”	  Requirement,	  
107	   NORTHWESTERN	   UNIVERSITY	   LAW	   REVIEW	   1125	   (2013),	   and	   Dawn	  M.	   Chutkow,	   The	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   Executive:	  
Judicial	  Conference	  Committee	  Appointments,	  2	  J.	  OF	  L.	  AND	  COURTS	  301	  (2014).	  
2018	   Court	  Presidents:	  Missing	  Piece	  in	  the	  Puzzle	  of	  Judicial	  Governance	   2039	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
devoted	   specifically	   to	   chief	   justices	   of	   apex	   courts,	   especially	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   and	  
their	   selection	   or	   dismissal.47	   Finally,	   as	   court	   presidents	   tend	   to	   fight	   back	   when	   their	  
powers	  are	  being	  curbed,	   their	  powers	  did	  not	  escape	   the	  attention	  of	  both	   the	  ECtHR48	  
and	  other	  international	  bodies.49	  	  
	  
However,	   all	   of	   these	   scholarly	  works	   and	  policy	  documents	   are	  quite	  narrowly	   focused,	  
either	  on	  a	  specific	  country,	  on	  a	  specific	  concept	  such	  as	   judicial	   independence,	  or	  on	  a	  
very	  specific	  court	  president,	  such	  as	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  
States.	   What	   we	   still	   lack	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   approach	   domestic	   court	   presidents	   from	   a	  
holistic	   and	   conceptual	   point	   of	   view	   that	   would	   allow	   us	   to	   compare	   their	   functioning	  
across	   jurisdictions	   as	   well	   as	   across	   different	   tiers	   of	   the	   judiciary	   within	   the	   same	  
jurisdiction.	  
	  
We	  know	  arguably	  even	  less	  about	  presidents	  of	  supranational	  and	  international	  courts.50	  
We	  can	  learn	  some	  fragments	  about	  the	  role	  of	  transnational51	  court	  presidents	  primarily	  
from	  their	   speeches,	  biographies,	  Festschriften	   (libri	  amicorum)	  and	   interviews.52	  Beyond	  
that,	   there	   is	   only	   a	   limited	   literature	   that	   attempts	   to	   address	   the	   role	   of	   transnational	  
court	   presidents	   in	   a	   conceptual	   way.	   Importantly,	   Terris,	   Romano	   and	   Swigart	   showed	  
                                                                                                                
46	   See	   e.g.	   Ghias,	   supra	   note	   22;	   Cristina	   Bonoan,	   Alejandro	   Ciencia	   &	   Björn	   Dressel,	   Thrilla	   in	   Manilla:	  
Impeachment	   of	   the	   Phillipines’	   Chief	   Justice,	   EAST	   ASIA	   FORUM,	   (March	   22,	   2012),	   http://www.eastasiaforum.or	  
g/2012/03/22/thrilla-­‐in-­‐manila-­‐impeachment-­‐of-­‐the-­‐philippine-­‐s-­‐chief-­‐justice/;	   Stefanus	   Hendrianto,	   The	   Rise	  
and	   Fall	   of	   Historic	   Chief	   Justices:	   Constitutional	   Politics	   and	   Judicial	   Leadership	   in	   Indonesia,	   25	   WASHINGTON	  
INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  JOURNAL	  489	  (2016);	  STEFANUS	  HENDRIANTO,	  LAW	  AND	  POLITICS	  OF	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  COURTS:	  INDONESIA	  
AND	  THE	  SEARCH	   FOR	   JUDICIAL	  HEROES	   (2018);	  and	  Rohit	  De	  &	  Tarunabh	  Khaitan,	   In	  Defence	  of	  Constitutionalism,	   I-­‐
CONNECT	  (January	  19,	  2018),	  http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/01/	  in-­‐defence-­‐of-­‐constitutionalism/.	  
47	  Pettys,	  supra	  note	  34.	  See	  also	  Vincze,	  supra	  note	  1;	  and	  Kosař	  &	  Šipulová	  2018,	  supra	  note	  1;	  Kierulf,	   supra	  
note	  21;	  and	  Bonoan,	  Ciencia	  &	  Dressel,	  supra	  note	  46.	  
48	  See	  e.	  g.	  Oleksandr	  Volkov	  v.	  Ukraine,	  EUR.	  CT.	  H.	  R.	  (Judgment	  of	  9	  January	  2013,	  app.	  no.	  21722/11);	  Denisov	  
v	  Ukraine,	   supra	   note	   15;	   Olujić	   v.	   Croatia,	   EUR.	   CT.	   H.	   R.	   (Judgment	   of	   5	   February	   2009,	   app.	   no.	   22330/05);	  
Harabin	  v.	  Slovakia,	  EUR.	  CT.	  H.	  R.	  (Judgment	  of	  20	  November	  2012,	  app.	  no.	  58688/11);	  Baka	  v.	  Hungary,	  EUR.	  CT.	  
H.	  R.	  (Judgment	  of	  23	  June	  2016,	  app.	  no.	  20261/12);	  and	  Wille	  v.	  Liechtenstein,	  supra	  note	  20.	  
49	   See	   e.	   g.	   the	   Opinion	   No.	   19	   (2016)	   of	   the	   Consultative	   Council	   of	   European	   Judges,	   The	   Role	   of	   Court	  
Presidents,	   https://rm.coe.int/1680748232;	   Report	   on	   the	   Independence	   of	   the	   Judicial	   System,	   Part	   I:	   The	  
Independence	  of	  Judges,	  Venice	  Commission,	  CDL-­‐AD(2010)004;	  or	  the	  Opinion	  on	  the	  Draft	  Law	  on	  the	  Judiciary	  
and	  the	  Draft	  Law	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Judges	  of	  Ukraine,	  Venice	  Commission,	  CDL-­‐AD(2007)003.	  
50	  See	  Nino	  Tsereteli	  &	  Hubert	  Smekal,	  The	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  at	  the	   International	  Level:	  A	  New	  Research	  
Agenda,	  in	  this	  issue.	  
51	  We	  are	  using	  the	  term	  “transnational	  courts”	  so	  as	  to	  cover	  both	  international	  and	  supranational	  courts.	  
52	  See	  e.g.	  Fred	  J.	  Bruinsma	  &	  Stephan	  Parmentier,	  Interview	  with	  Mr.	  Luzius	  Wildhaber,	  President	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  1	  
NETH.	  Q.	  HUM.	  RTS.	  185	  (2003);	  and	  Fernanda	  Nicola	  &	  Bill	  Davies,	  Judges	  as	  Diplomats	   in	  Advancing	  the	  Rule	  of	  
Law:	  A	  Conversation	  with	  President	  Koen	  Lenaerts	  and	  Justice	  Stephen	  Breyer,	  66	  AMERICAN	  UNIVERSITY	  LAW	  REVIEW	  
1159	  (2017).	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that	   the	   presidents	   of	   international	   courts	   typically	   serve	   four	   distinct	   functions:	   judge,	  
administrator,	  public	  spokesperson	  and	  diplomat.53	  According	  to	  them,	  especially	  the	   last	  
role	   involves	  the	  president	   in	  direct	  and	  frequent	  contact	  with	  governments	   (because	  of,	  
among	   other	   things,	   reporting	   on	   the	   work	   of	   the	   courts	   and	   securing	   funds	   and	   other	  
resources),	  which	  requires	  a	  delicate	  balance	  between	  the	  judicial	  and	  political	  functions	  of	  
the	  international	  court.54	  Even	  international	  relations	  scholars	  started	  to	  touch	  upon	  court	  
presidents	   only	   recently,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   studies	   on	   informal	   judicial	   practices	   at	  
international	   courts55	   and	   international	   judicial	   diplomacy.56	   These	   studies	   reveal	  
important	  details	  about	  the	  jurisprudential57	  and	  ambassadorial58	  powers	  of	   international	  
court	  presidents,	  but	  none	  of	  these	  studies	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  court	  presidents.	  	  
	  
Beyond	   the	   United	   States,59	   there	   is	   not	  much	   theorizing	   about	   court	   presidents	   in	   the	  
scholarly	  literature	  and,	  if	  there	  is,	  it	  concerns	  primarily	  CEE	  countries.	  For	  instance,	  several	  
scholars	   argued,	   explicitly	   or	   implicitly,	   that	   Eastern	   European	   court	   presidents	   naturally	  
wield	  more	  power	  than	  their	  counterparts	   in	  Western	  Europe.60	  However,	  we	  still	  do	  not	  
know	  whether	   this	   claim	   can	  be	   generalized	   to	   all	   jurisdictions	   in	   these	   two	   regions	   and	  
why	  it	  is	  so.61	  Court	  presidents	  play	  some	  role	  in	  Daniela	  Piana’s	  “two-­‐wave-­‐theory”	  of	  CEE	  
                                            
53	  Daniel	  Terris,	  Cesare	  Romano	  &	  Leigh	  Swigart,	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  JUDGE:	  AN	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  THE	  MEN	  AND	  WOMEN	  
WHO	  DECIDE	  THE	  WORLD’S	  CASES	  159	  (2007).	  
54	  Ibid.	  
55	  See	  Jeffrey	  L.	  Dunoff	  &	  Mark	  A.	  Pollack,	  International	  Judicial	  Practices:	  Opening	  the	  ‘Black	  Box’	  of	  International	  
Courts,	  MICHIGAN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (forthcoming).	  
56	  See	  Theresa	  Squatrito,	  Judicial	  Diplomacy:	  International	  Courts	  and	  their	  Agents	  on	  a	  Mission	  (paper	  presented	  
at	   ECPR	   General	   Conference	   in	   Hamburg	   on	   23	   August	   2018).	   See	   also	   Nicole	   de	   Silva,	   Beyond	   Adjudication:	  
International	  Courts’	  Agency	  and	  Entrepreneurship	  in	  Governance	  (paper	  presented	  at	  LSA	  conference	  in	  Toronto	  
on	  7	  June	  2018).	  
57	  For	  instance,	  the	  ICJ	  President	  takes	  the	  lead	  in	  framing	  the	  ICJ	  judgment	  as	  she	  circulates	  the	  list	  of	  issues	  that	  
she	   thinks	   should	   be	   addressed	   in	   the	   judgment	   after	   the	   oral	   hearing,	   she	   speaks	   last	   at	   the	   deliberation	   of	  
judges	   and	   indicates	   her	   views	   of	   the	   arguments	   and	   rationales	   that	   enjoy	   majority	   support,	   and	   she	   sits	  
automatically	  (unless	  she	  is	  in	  the	  minority)	  in	  the	  three-­‐person	  judgment	  drafting	  committee.	  For	  further	  details,	  
see	  Dunoff	  &	  Pollack,	  supra	  note	  55.	  
58	  For	  instance,	  the	  ICJ	  President	  has	  been	  issuing	  an	  annual	  report	  since	  1968,	  has	  been	  presenting	  this	  report	  at	  
the	   regular	   session	  of	   the	  UN	  General	   Assembly,	   and	   initiated	   a	   practice	   of	   providing	   a	   private	   briefing	   to	   the	  
Security	  Council	  on	  the	  pending	  cases	  in	  2000	  (see	  Dunoff	  &	  Pollack,	  supra	  note	  55).	  	  
59	  But	  even	  there	  the	  scholarship	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  (see	  in	  particular	  Danelski	  &	  Artemus	  Ward,	  supra	  note	  34;	  and	  literature	  in	  note	  34)	  and	  to	  a	  large	  
extent	  neglects	  the	  role	  of	  lower	  federal	  courts	  and	  state	  courts	  presidents.	  
60	  See	  in	  particular	  Solomon	  2012,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  918;	  Müller,	  supra	  note	  17;	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  390;	  and	  
Anna	  Wallerman,	  Review	  of	  David	  Kosař,	  Perils	  of	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	   in	  Transitional	  Societies,	  55	  COMMON	  
MARKET	  LAW	  REVIEW	  676,	  677	  (2018).	  For	  further	  literature,	  see	  Part	  D.	  
61	  We	  revisit	  this	  claim	  in	  Part	  D.	  
2018	   Court	  Presidents:	  Missing	  Piece	  in	  the	  Puzzle	  of	  Judicial	  Governance	   2041	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
judicial	  councils.62	  This	  theory	  argues	  that	  those	  actors	  who	  emerged	  as	  winners	  from	  the	  
first	  “transition	  wave”	  of	  judicial	  reforms	  (between	  1989	  and	  1997),	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  
or	  the	  judicial	  council	  (often	  composed	  of	  or	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  court	  presidents),	  were	  
better	   placed	   in	   the	   second	   “pre-­‐accession	   wave”	   (between	   1998	   and	   2006)	   of	   judicial	  
reforms	   and	   exploited	   the	   opportunities	   provided	   by	   the	   European	   Union	   to	   entrench	  
existing	  domestic	   allocations	   of	   power.63	   Court	   presidents	   play	   an	   even	  more	  prominent	  
role	  in	  Kosař’s	   judicial	   leadership	  theory	  of	  CEE	  judicial	  councils.	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  
the	   introduction	   of	   the	   strong	   judicial	   council	   model	   of	   court	   administration	   into	   a	  
bureaucratic	  CEE	  judiciary	  in	  the	  medium	  term	  empowers	  judicial	  leadership,	  namely	  court	  
presidents,	  who	   then	  use	   their	   newly	   accrued	  powers	   to	   punish	   their	   critics	   and	   reward	  
their	  allies	  within	  the	  judiciary	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  their	  privileges	  and	  influence.64	  Finally,	  
Kosař	  used	  the	  “bargaining	   in	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	   law”	  metaphor	   in	  examining	  how	  Czech	  
court	   presidents,	   step	   by	   step,	   managed	   to	   erode	   the	   Minister	   of	   Justice’s	   sphere	   of	  
influence	  in	  court	  administration	  and	  have	  themselves	  become	  the	  most	  powerful	  figures	  
within	  the	  Czech	  judiciary.65	  	  
	  
To	   summarize	   this	  part,	  we	  know	   that	   court	  presidents	  may	  wield	   significant	  power	   and	  
play	  various	  roles,	  both	  within	  their	  courts	  and	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  external	  actors.	  We	  also	  know	  that	  
court	  presidents	   are	  particularly	   strong	   in	   some	  Eastern	  European	   countries,	  where	   they	  
may,	   under	   some	   circumstances,	   become	   the	  masterminds	  of	   their	   judiciaries.	  However,	  
we	   lack	   thorough	  understanding	  of	   the	  nature	  of	  court	  presidents’	   competences.	  Nor	  do	  
we	   know	   in	   what	   ways	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   role	   of	   court	   president	   actually	   differs	  
between	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  as	  all	  studies	  to	  date	  focused	  only	  on	  a	  very	  limited	  
set	   of	   jurisdictions.	   In	   order	   to	   answer	   these	   questions	   in	   the	   next	   two	   Parts	   we	   first	  
conceptualize	   the	  powers	  of	   court	  presidents	  and	   then	  we	  compare	  how	   important	   they	  
are	   as	   players	   in	   13	   European	   jurisdictions.	   Finally,	   in	   Part	   D	   we	   identify	   contingent	  
circumstances	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  exercise	  of	  these	  powers	  in	  practice.	  
	  
B.	  Powers	  of	  Court	  Presidents	  
	  
We	  have	  suggested	  above	  that	  court	  presidents,	  although	  often	  overlooked,	  may	  become	  
quite	   strong	   and	   influential	   actors	   within	   their	   judiciaries.	   This	   claim	   naturally	   begs	   the	  
question	  what	   the	  nature	  of	   their	  power	   is	  and	   in	  what	  areas	   it	  materializes.	   In	  order	   to	  
                                            
62	  See	  in	  particular	  Piana,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  43–44.	  
63	  See	  Daniela	  Piana,	  The	  Power	  Knocks	  at	  the	  Courts’	  Back	  Door	  –	  Two	  Waves	  of	  Postcommunist	  Judicial	  Reforms,	  
42	  COMPARATIVE	  POLITICAL	  STUDIES	  816	  (2009);	  and	  Piana,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  162–165.	  Note	  that	  other	  scholars	  have	  
shown	  that	  Piana’s	   two-­‐wave	   theory	  does	  not	  work	   in	  all	  CEE	  countries.	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  10–11	   (on	  
Slovakia).	  
64	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  16–19	  and	  398–405.	  
65	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  11	  (on	  Czechia).	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answer	   this	   question	   we	   unpack	   the	   power	   of	   court	   presidents	   into	   seven	   smaller	  
components	  and	  show	  how	  court	  presidents	  may	  exploit	  them.	  While	  we	  eventually	  argue	  
that	  these	  components	  are	  interconnected	  and	  that	  these	  “subpowers”	  of	  court	  presidents	  
should	   be	   viewed	   holistically,	   we	   find	   this	   “unpacking	   exercise”	   necessary,	   because	   it	  
allows	   us	   to	   compare	   European	   judiciaries	   in	   Part	   C	   in	   a	   far	   more	   nuanced	   way	   than	  
without	  it.	  	  
	  
However,	  we	   need	   to	   add	   three	   important	   caveats	   here.	   First,	  we	   are	   not	   claiming	   that	  
every	   court	   president	   has	   all	   of	   these	   powers.	  Our	   aim	   is	   to	   conceptualize	   the	   potential	  
powers	   that	   court	   presidents	   may	   have.	   Whether	   a	   particular	   court	   president	   actually	  
enjoys	  these	  powers	  depends,	  among	  other	  things,	  on	  the	  legal	  framework	  in	  a	  particular	  
jurisdiction,	  on	  the	  prevailing	  political	  and	  legal	  culture,	  and	  on	  the	  tier	  of	  the	  judiciary	  he	  
sits	  on.	  Second,	  we	  do	  not	  limit	  our	  analysis	  merely	  to	  conceptualization	  of	  formal	  powers.	  
Many	   of	   the	   powers	   discussed	   below	   are	   informal.	   However,	   we	   find	   them	   equally	  
important	  for	  understanding	  the	  scope	  of	  power	  of	  court	  presidents	  in	  each	  jurisdiction.66	  
Third,	  we	  leave	  aside	  presidents	  of	  administrative	  courts	  and	  special	  tribunals.	  
	  
I.	  Power	  over	  Judicial	  Careers	  
	  
By	   far	   the	   most	   important	   power	   that	   court	   presidents	   in	   many	   countries	   wield	   is	   the	  
power	  over	  the	  career	  of	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  judges.	  Their	  influence	  over	  such	  career	  may	  start	  at	  
the	  very	  beginning	  of	  it	  with	  powers	  over	  the	  selection	  and	  appointment	  of	  judges	  that	  can	  
range	   from	   informal	   influence	   over	   the	   bodies	   that	   select	   judges	   to	   direct	   power,	   both	  
formal	  and	   informal,	   to	  pick	   judges	  by	   themselves.67	  The	   typical	  examples	  of	  an	   indirect,	  
albeit	  formal,	  power	  can	  be	  found	  at	  the	  ECtHR	  and	  the	  CJEU.	  The	  President	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  is	  
consulted	  on	  appointments	   to	   the	  Advisory	  Panel	   that	  monitors	   the	  election	  of	   judges.68	  
The	  President	  of	  the	  CJEU	  plays	  an	  even	  greater	  role	  as	  he	  alone	  proposes	  members	  to	  the	  
Article	   255	   TFEU	   panel	   and	   also	   defines	   its	   operating	   rules.69	   Irish	   court	   presidents	   also	  
have	  significant	  influence	  over	  the	  selection	  of	  judges,	  as	  they	  have	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  Judicial	  
                                            
66	   For	   a	   comprehensive	   explanation	   of	   why	   informal	   powers	   are	   important,	   see	   Dressel,	   Sanchez–Urribarri	   &	  
Stroh,	  supra	  note	  44.	  
67	  Understandably,	   in	   some	  countries,	   court	  presidents	  have	   little	  or	  no	   influence	  over	   selection	  of	   judges.	   For	  
instance,	   in	  Romania	   it	   is	   the	  National	   Institute	  of	  Magistracy,	  which	   is	   coordinated	  by	   the	  Superior	  Council	   of	  
Magistracy,	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	   recruiting	   and	   training	   new	   judges.	   The	   Superior	   Council	   of	   Magistracy	   is	  
strongly	  anti–hierarchical	  and	  court	  presidents	  have	  little	  influence	  within	  it.	  See	  Bianca	  Selejan-­‐Guțan,	  Romania:	  
Perils	   of	   a	   “Perfect	   Euro-­‐Model”	   of	   Judicial	   Council,	   in	   this	   issue;	   and	   Bogdan	   Iancu,	   Perils	   of	   Sloganised	  
Constitutional	  Concepts,	  Notably	  that	  of	  ‘Judicial	  Independence’,	  13	  EUROPEAN	  CONST.	  LAW	  R.	  582,	  594	  (2017).	  
68	  Shai	  Dothan,	  The	  Motivations	  of	  Individual	  Judges	  and	  How	  They	  Act	  as	  a	  Group,	  in	  this	  issue.	  
69	  Krenn,	  supra	  note	  26;	  and	  Dothan,	  supra	  note	  68.	  Note	  also	  that	  according	  to	  the	  Art.	  255	  TFEU	  the	  European	  
Parliament	   proposes	   one	   member,	   which	   is	   than	   included	   by	   the	   President	   of	   the	   CJEU	   in	   the	   list	   of	   Panel	  
members	  appointed	  by	  the	  Member	  States.	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Appointments	  Advisory	  Board	  that	  proposes	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  a	  list	  of	  candidates	  
for	  the	  office	  of	  judge.	  Even	  though	  the	  Minister	  does	  not	  have	  to	  pick	  from	  that	  list,	  it	  is	  a	  
strong	  social	  convention.70	  
	  
In	   other	   countries,	   court	   presidents	  may	   even	   become	   the	   principal	   gatekeepers	   to	   the	  
judiciary.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Czechia71	  it	  is	  formally	  the	  Minister	  of	  Justice	  who	  selects	  judges	  
and	   the	   Czech	   President	   who	   appoints	   them,	   but	   in	   practice	   court	   presidents	   of	   the	  
regional	  and	  apex	  courts	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  de	  facto	  handpick	  the	  judges	  to	  “their”	  courts.72	  
As	  detailed	  substantive	  criteria	  for	  the	  selection	  of	   judges	  are	  lacking73	   it	  fell	  to	  the	  court	  
presidents	  to	  sift	  through	  the	  potential	  candidates	  and	  pick	  the	  ones	  who	  may	  eventually	  
end	   up	   at	   their	   court,	   giving	   them	   substantial	   power.74	   This	   not	   only	   allows	   court	  
presidents	  to	  shape	  the	  judiciary	  by	  favoring	  the	  candidates	  who	  share	  their	  views,	  but	  also	  
gives	   them	   significant	   leverage	   over	   these	   newcomers	   on	   the	   bench	   as	   the	   selected	  
candidates	   may	   feel	   that	   they	   owe	   loyalty	   to	   the	   court	   president	   who	   actually	   picked	  
them.75	  But	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  Czechia.	  Court	  presidents	  in	  Slovenia76	  and	  
Slovakia77	  also	  de	  facto	  guard	  the	  entrance	  to	  the	  judiciary,	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  
judicial	  council	  exists	  in	  both	  countries.	  
	  
But	  court	  presidents’	  power	  over	  the	  careers	  of	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	   judges	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
end	  with	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  new	  judge.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	   judges	  may	  depend	  
on	  court	  presidents	  even	  more,	  as	  the	  latter	  may	  have	  a	  significant	  say	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  
judges	   to	   higher	   courts.	   In	   fact,	   this	   is	   a	   common	   practice	   in	   Europe.	   In	   France,	   court	  
                                            
70	  Patrick	  O’Brien,	  Never	   let	  a	  Crisis	  go	  to	  Waste:	  Politics,	  Personality	  and	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	   in	   Ireland,	   in	  
this	  issue.	  	  
71	  Zdeněk	  Kühn,	  Judicial	  Administration	  Reforms	  in	  Central-­‐Eastern	  Europe:	  Lessons	  to	  be	  Learned,	  In	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  
supra	  note	  17,	  at	  603,	  612;	  and	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  97	  and	  100.	   	  
72	  For	  further	  details	  on	  the	  selection	  of	  judges,	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  188–191	  and	  215–216.	  	  
73	   The	   only	   legal	   requirements	   for	   being	   appointed	   a	   judge	   are	   the	   following	   general	   criteria:	   the	   Czech	  
nationality,	  the	  age	  of	  thirty,	  a	  clean	  criminal	  record,	  a	  negative	  lustration	  certificate,	  legal	  education,	  and	  three	  
years	  of	  practice.	  
74	  MoJ	  has	   tried	   to	  wrestle	   some	  of	   the	  power	  back	   in	  2017	  by	   issuing,	  probably	  unconstitutional,	   instructions	  
detailing	  the	  criteria	  and	  the	  process	  of	  selection	  and	  training	  of	  the	  candidates.	  
75	  This	  arguably	  makes	  these	  newly	  selected	  judges,	  handpicked	  by	  court	  presidents,	  more	  susceptible	  to	  eventual	  
pressure	  by	  court	  presidents,	  which	  in	  turn	  has	  a	  potentially	  negative	  impact	  on	  judicial	  independence.	  
76	  Matej	  Avbelj,	  Contextual	  Analysis	  of	  Judicial	  Governance	  in	  Slovenia,	  in	  this	  issue.	  
77	  Samuel	  Spáč,	  Katarína	  Šipulová	  &	  Marína	  Urbániková,	  Capturing	  the	  Judiciary	  from	  Inside:	  The	  Story	  of	  Judicial	  
Self-­‐Governance	  in	  Slovakia,	  in	  this	  issue.	  But	  note	  that	  presidents	  of	  regional	  courts	  have	  greater	  influence	  than	  
presidents	  of	  district	  courts.	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presidents	   assess	   judges	   by	   themselves;78	   in	   Slovenia	   they	   chair	   the	   Personnel	   Councils	  
that	   peer-­‐review	   judges	   and	   make	   recommendations	   as	   to	   their	   career	   advancement;79	  
and	   in	   Slovakia	   they	   decide	   on	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   committees	   that	   promote	   judges	  
and	  on	  secondments,	  which	  significantly	  increases	  judge’s	  chances	  of	  being	  promoted.80	  In	  
Germany	   court	   presidents	   chair	   the	   Presidential	   Councils	   (Präsidialräte)	   that	   write	   a	  
statement	  on	  the	  qualities	  of	   judges	  up	  for	  promotion.81	  This	   is	  something	  German	  rank-­‐
and-­‐file	   judges	  may	  take	  into	  account	  when	  deciding	  cases.	  More	  specifically,	   it	  has	  been	  
reported	  that	  judges	  who	  seek	  promotion	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  adjust	  their	  decision-­‐making	  
according	  to	  the	  views	  of	  their	  court	  presidents	  and	  that	  maverick	   judges	  may	  be	  denied	  
promotion.82	   If	   this	  may	  happen	   in	  Germany,	   it	   is	  highly	   likely	   that	  similar	  considerations	  
are	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  other	  jurisdictions	  too.	  
	  
To	  be	   sure,	   court	  presidents	   are	  not	   accidentally	   given	   this	  power	  over	   judicial	   selection	  
and	  promotion.	  They	  are	  actually	  the	  ones	  who	  have	  the	  best	  overview	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  
within	  their	  courts,	  what	  kind	  of	   judge	  they	  need	  to	  complement	  their	  “team”,	  and	  what	  
the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  each	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	   judge	  are.	  For	  the	  very	  same	  reason,	  
court	   presidents	   are	   also	   the	   ones	   who	   may	   and	   most	   often	   do	   subject	   judges	   to	  
accountability	   mechanisms83	   such	   as	   disciplinary	   proceedings,84	   case-­‐assignment	   and	  
reassignment,85	  and	  periodic	  judicial	  performance	  evaluation.86	  All	  of	  these	  accountability	  
mechanisms	  may,	  each	  in	  its	  own	  way,	  affect	  the	  career	  of	  a	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  judge.	  
	  
II.	  Administrative	  Power	  
	  
                                            
78	  Antoine	  Vauchez,	  The	  Strange	  Non-­‐Death	  of	   Statism:	  Tracing	  The	  Ever	  Protracted	  Rise	  of	   Self-­‐Government	   in	  
France,	  In	  this	  issue;	  Antoine	  Garapon	  &	  Harold	  Epineuse,	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  France,	  in	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  
note	  17,	  at	  273,	  285–286.	  
79	  Avbelj,	  supra	  note	  76.	  See	  especially	  the	  citation	  of	  a	  resignation	  letter	  by	  the	  former	  Judicial	  Council	  member,	  
Nevenka	  Šorli,	  who	  claimed	  that	  it	  is	  the	  Personnel	  Councils	  that	  make	  the	  decision	  on	  promotion	  of	  a	  judge.	  
80	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  77.	  
81	  Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  Germany,	  in	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  447,	  460.	  
82	  See	  Stephen	  Ross	  Levitt,	  The	  Life	  and	  Times	  of	  a	  Local	  Court	  Judge	  in	  Berlin,	  10	  GERMAN	  L.J.	  169,	  197–8	  (2009);	  
and	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  502.	  
83	  For	  taxonomy	  of	  these	  mechanisms,	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  73–120.	  
84	  This	  is	  the	  case	  in	  Czechia,	  Slovakia	  or	  France;	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  214,	  234;	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  
supra	  note	  77;	  and	  Garapon	  &	  Epineuse,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  292.	  
85	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  77;	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  212,	  232.	  
86	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Romania	  or	  Slovenia,	  see	  Gutan,	  supra	  note	  67;	  and	  Avbelj,	  supra	  note	  76.	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Court	   presidents	   may	   affect	   not	   only	   the	   careers	   of	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	   judges,	   but	   also	   their	  
everyday	  lives	  and	  work.	  They	  often	  have	  broad	  managerial	  powers	  that	  can	  be	  used	  quite	  
effectively.	  Most	   importantly	   they	  may	  decide	  what	  cases,	  and	  how	  many,	  each	   judge	  at	  
their	  courts	  will	  deal	  with.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  either	  by	  deciding	  in	  what	  chamber	  a	  judge	  will	  
sit	  or	  through	  the	  power	  to	  assign	  cases.	  	  
	  
The	  composition	  of	  a	  panel	  matters	  in	  all	  jurisdictions.87	  If	  a	  court	  president	  may	  reshuffle	  
the	  panels	  according	  to	  her	   liking,	  she	  may	   influence	  the	  dynamics	  within	  the	  panels	  and	  
sometimes	  even	   change	   the	  outcome	  of	   a	   case.88	  However,	   assigning	   to	   a	   chamber	  or	   a	  
panel89	   matters	   even	   more	   when	   judges	   are	   not	   generalists	   and	   the	   chambers	   are	  
specialized	   in	   some	   area	   of	   law.90	   Typically,	   courts	   have	   separate	   civil	   and	   criminal	  
divisions,	   but	   sometimes	   the	   specialization	   of	   judges	   goes	  much	   further	   and	   the	   special	  
chambers	  focus	  on	  a	  very	  narrow	  area	  of	  law,	  such	  as	  bankruptcy	  law,	  intellectual	  property	  
law	   or	   competition	   law.	   In	   such	   scenario,	   court	   presidents	   de	   facto	   decide	   on	   the	  
specialization	  of	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	   judges	  at	  their	  courts	  and	  may	  even	  repeatedly	  force	  them	  
to	  adjust	  to	  the	  new	  area	  of	  law,	  which	  can	  be	  frustrating	  at	  times.	  
	  
Case	  assignment	  is	  an	  even	  more	  straightforward	  technique.	  If	  a	  court	  president	  can	  assign	  
cases	  on	  a	  discretionary	  basis91	  or	  can	  at	  least	  influence	  the	  mechanism	  of	  distribution	  of	  
cases,	  she	  may	  achieve	  the	  same	  ends.	  The	  comparative	  analysis	  shows	  that	  random	  case	  
assignment	  coupled	  with	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  judge	  to	  challenge	  the	  allegedly	  
improper	   assignment	   of	   a	   particular	   case	   exists	   only	   in	   few	   jurisdictions	   covered	   by	   this	  
special	   issue.92	   In	   most	   countries,	   court	   presidents	   can	   either	   assign	   cases	   on	   a	  
discretionary	  basis,	  or	  they	  determine93	  (or	  at	  least	  heavily	  influence)94	  the	  rules	  (typically	  
                                            
87	  For	  a	  recent	  example	  beyond	  Europe,	  see	  the	  controversial	  actions	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  India	  in	  De	  &	  Khaitan,	  
supra	  note	  46.	  
88	  See	  also	  below	  on	  the	  jurisprudential	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents.	  
89	   E.g.	   in	   Italy,	   Czechia,	   Netherlands,	   see	   Simone	   Benvenuti	   &	   Davide	   Paris,	   Judicial	   Self-­‐Government	   in	   Italy:	  
Merits,	   Limits	   and	   the	   Reality	   of	   an	   Export	   Model,	   in	   this	   issue;	   Adam	   Blisa,	   Tereza	   Papoušková	   &	   Marína	  
Urbániková,	  Judicial	  Self-­‐Government	  in	  Czechia:	  Europe’s	  Black	  Sheep?,	  in	  this	  issue;	  and	  Elaine	  Mak,	  Judicial	  Self-­‐
Government	  in	  the	  Netherlands:	  Demarcating	  Autonomy,	  in	  this	  issue.	  
90	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  80.	  
91	  France,	  see	  Garapon	  &	  Epineuse,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  288.	  	  
92	   See	   e.	   g.	   Germany,	   see	   Siebert-­‐Fohr,	   supra	   note	   81,	   at	   486;	   and	   Fabian	   Wittreck,	   German	   Judicial	   Self-­‐
Government:	  Institutions	  and	  constraints	  of	  self-­‐government	  in	  Germany,	  in	  this	  issue.	  
93	   Czechia,	   Ireland,	   Italy,	   France,	   Netherlands	   and	   others,	   see	   Blisa,	   Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	   supra	   note	   89;	  
O’Brien,	  supra	  note	  70;	  Vauchez,	  supra	  note	  78;	  and	  Mak,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
94	  Cf.	  Slovakia,	  in	  which	  cases	  are	  since	  2002	  assigned	  randomly	  by	  a	  computer,	  see	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  
supra	  note	  77.	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in	   the	   so-­‐called	   “work	   schedule”)	   of	   case	   assignment.	  Moreover,	   even	   in	   countries	   that	  
established	   random	   initial	   case	   assignment	   court	   presidents	   may	   exploit	   the	   loopholes	  
within	  this	  system,95	  override	  the	  initial	  case	  assignment	  and	  reassign	  the	  case	  to	  another	  
judge.96	  
	  
The	  crucial	  nature	  of	  these	  two	  powers	  is	  obvious,	  because	  by	  simply	  assigning	  a	  judge	  to	  a	  
specific	   chamber	   a	   court	   president	   can	   determine	   her	   specialization	   for	   the	   future,	   and	  
assigning	  a	   judge	  to	  a	  chamber	  dealing	  with	  cases	  outside	  her	  specialization	  can	  even	  be	  
used	  as	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  punishing	  a	  recalcitrant	   judge.97	  Similarly	  the	  power	  to	  assign	  
cases,	  when	  purely	  discretionary,	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  reward	  or	  punish	  by	  distributing	  
cases	  unevenly	   according	   to	   their	   difficulty,	   number,	   political	   salience	   and	  other	   criteria.	  
However,	   in	   those	   countries	   where	   the	   right	   to	   a	   legal	   judge	   (gesetzlicher	   Richter)	   has	  
constitutional	   rank,98	   the	   power	   of	   court	   presidents	   to	   tinker	   with	   case	   assignment	   is	  
substantially	  reduced	  or	  even	  eliminated.99	  
	  
With	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  public	  management	  and	  the	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  the	  speediness	  of	  
justice,	   court	   presidents	   also	   increasingly	   set	   caseload	   quotas	   and	   police	   their	  
fulfillment.100	   This	   control	   often	   goes	  beyond	   the	  mere	   checking	  of	   the	  number	  of	   cases	  
disposed	   of	   and	   may	   materialize	   into	   a	   full-­‐fledged	   regulation	   of	   case-­‐flow	   and	   judicial	  
performance	  evaluation.	  Through	  these	  mechanisms	  court	  presidents	  may	  motivate	  slower	  
judges,	   but	   they	  may	   also	   exercise	   inappropriate	   pressure	   that	   impinges	   upon	   the	   core	  
judicial	  values101	  or	  create	  a	  “culture	  of	  numbers”	  that	  may	  result	  in	  output	  perversions.102	  	  
	  
Finally,	  court	  presidents	  also	  possess	  other	  administrative	  powers	  that	  do	  not	  have	  a	  direct	  
bearing	  on	  decision-­‐making,	  but	   still	  have	  a	   significant	   impact	  on	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  of	  
                                            
95	  Similar	  mechanism	  exists	  in	  Romania,	  but	  is	  not	  allegedly	  completely	  resistant	  to	  rigging,	  see	  Coman	  &	  Dallara,	  
supra	  note	  36,	  at	  862.	  
96	  On	  Harabin	   in	   Slovakia,	   see	   Kosař,	  supra	   note	  9,	   at	  320–321,	  327–329.	  See	   also	   recent	   Indian	   controversy	   in	  
India	  in	  De	  &	  Khaitan,	  supra	  note	  87.	  	  
97	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  81;	  and	  Popova,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  136–138.	   	  
98	  E.	  g.	  in	  Germany	  or	  Czechia.	  See	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  481–483;	  or	  David	  Kosař,	  Rozvrh	  práce:	  Klíčový	  
nástroj	  pro	  boj	  s	  korupcí	  soudců	  a	  nezbytný	  předpoklad	  nezávislosti	  řadových	  soudců,	  154	  PRÁVNÍK	  1049	  (2015).	  
99	  This	  goes	  especially	  for	  the	  countries	  with	  electronic	  randomized	  distribution	  of	  cases,	  see	  supra	  notes	  94	  and	  
95.	  
100	  E.	  g.	  Mak,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
101	  Tomer	  Zarchin,	  Nir	  Haason	  &	  Yaniv	  Kubovich,	  Jerusalem	  Judge	  Commits	  a	  Suicide	  Due	   to	  Workload,	  HAARETZ	  
(February	  9,	  2011),	  https://www.haaretz.com/1.5119677.	  
102	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  70–71.	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judges.103	   First	   of	   all,	   they	   process	   complaints	   against	   judges.104	   Second,	   they	   hire	   and	  
dismiss	  administrative	   staff	  at	   their	   court	   (or	  even	  courts),105	   ranging	   from	  secretaries	   to	  
law	   clerks.106	   Furthermore,	   court	   presidents	   control	   or	   influence	   the	   administration	   of	  
material	  resources	  at	  their	  courts107	  and	  exercise	  further	  executive	  functions.108	  They	  also	  
approve	  judges’	  travel	  to	  conferences	  and	  their	  extrajudicial	  activities.	  Simply	  abusing	  one	  
of	  these	  powers	  can	  rarely	  create	  more	  than	  a	  nuisance	  (e.g.	  giving	  a	  judge	  a	  small	  office)	  
and	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  a	  heavy	  impact	  by	  itself	  but,	  when	  cleverly	  combined,	  they	  may	  have	  
the	  effect	  of	  “death	  by	  a	  thousand	  cuts”	  –	  a	  judge	  with	  a	  small	  office,	  a	  slow	  computer	  with	  
a	  slow	  Internet	  connection,	  relying	  on	  ineffective	  administrative	  staff	  and	  an	  incompetent	  
law	  clerk,	  overburdened	  due	  to	  unfavorable	  case	  assignment	  mechanisms,	  may	  either	  fold	  
and	   give	   in	   to	   the	   pressure	   of	   the	   court	   president,	   resign	   or	   make	   a	   mistake	   and	   be	  
potentially	  exposed	  to	  disciplinary	  proceedings.109	  	  
	  
III.	  Jurisprudential	  Power	  
	  
Court	  presidents	  also	  wield	   jurisprudential	  power.	   If	   they	  are	   leading	  figures	   in	  their	   field	  
and	  possess	  a	  healthy	  dose	  of	  leadership	  skills	  and	  judicial	  statesmanship,	  they	  may	  set	  the	  
courts’	   agenda	  and	  even	   shape	   the	   law.	  At	   lower	   courts,	   court	  presidents	  may	   influence	  
their	  younger	  colleagues,	  especially	  at	   the	  bureaucratic	  civil	   law	   judiciaries	  where	   judicial	  
candidates	  become	  judges	  only	  a	  few	  years	  after	  law	  school	  and	  are	  completely	  socialized	  
within	  the	  judiciary.	  At	  apex	  courts,	  the	  court	  presidents	  often	  have	  additional	  institutional	  
advantages,	   such	   as	   opinion	   assignment,	   deciding	   on	   the	   vote	   order,	   third-­‐party	  
interventions110	  and	  additional	  resources,111	  which	  they	  may	  utilize	  to	  set	  the	  agenda	  and	  
promote	   their	   preferences.	   Chief	   Justices	   also	   often	   automatically	   sit	   on	   the	   grand	  
                                            
103	  Netherlands,	   Czechia,	   Slovenia	   and	   others,	   see	  Mak,	   supra	   note	   89;	   Blisa,	   Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	   supra	  
note	  89;	  and	  Avbelj,	  supra	  note	  76.	  
104	  E.g.	  in	  Czechia	  or	  Slovakia,	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  221–222,	  229,	  275,	  285.	  
105	  This	  goes	  for	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  see	  Pfander,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  1132–
1137.	  
106	  This	   is	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ECtHR,	  on	   legal	  staff,	  see	  Dothan,	  supra	  note	  68;	  or	  Germany,	  see	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  
note	  81,	  at	  456–457.	  
107	  Vicki	  C.	  Jackson,	  Judicial	  Independence:	  Structure,	  Context,	  Attitude,	   in	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  19,	  53-­‐
54;	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  90-­‐91;	  Popova,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  59;	  Schwartz	  &	  Sykiainen,	  supra	  note	  36,	  at	  976.	  
108	  See	  Pfander,	  supra	  note	  45,	  and	  Chutkow,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  303–304.	  
109	  This	  happened	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  in	  Slovakia,	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  361.	  
110	  Çalı	  &	  Cunningham,	  supra	  note	  29.	  
111	  The	  extra	  resources	  may	  include,	  among	  other	  things,	  more	  law	  clerks,	  more	  secretarial	  support,	  and	  special	  
research	  divisions;	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  403.	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chamber112	  (or	  similar	  extended	  bodies	  that	  unify	  the	  case	  law	  and	  decide	  the	  most	  vexing	  
issues)	  and	  may	  even	  decide	  on	  the	  grand	  chamber’s	  composition.113	  All	  of	  this	  gives	  them	  
additional	   leverage	   and	   distinguishes	   them	   from	   senior	   judges,	   who	   may	   also	   have	  
jurisprudential	  power,	  but	  they	  have	  to	  rely	  solely	  on	  their	  erudition	  and	  reputation.	  
	  
Court	   presidents	  may	   also	   foster	   consensual	   decision-­‐making	   by	   skillful	   framing	   of	   cases	  
and	  alleviating	  tensions	  among	  their	  colleagues.	  Vice	  versa,	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  forge	  consensus,	  
the	   level	  of	   conflict	  at	  a	  given	  court	  may	  skyrocket.	  This	  may	   in	   turn	   result	   in	   the	   rise	  of	  
dissenting	  and	  concurring	  opinions.114	  This	  arguably	  happened	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  
after	  Harlan	   Fisk	   Stone	  was	   elevated	   to	   the	   position	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   (1941–1946).115	  
Studies	   on	   changing	   dissent	   rates	   in	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Canada,116	   the	  High	   Court	   of	  
Australia,117	   and	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Norway118	   also	   found	   that	   court	   leadership	   is	  
important	   in	   explaining	   variation	   of	   dissent	   over	   time.	   Even	   if	   separate	   opinions	   are	   not	  
allowed,	  which	   is	   the	  case	  for	  most	  continental	  ordinary	  courts,	   lackluster	   leadership	  has	  
significant	   jurisprudential	   effects,	   albeit	   less	   visible	   than	   the	   separate	   opinions.	   Failing	  
leadership	   at	   lower	   courts	   may	   cause	   the	   increase	   of	   divergent	   opinions	   across	   courts’	  
various	   panels,	  which	   in	   turn	  may	   increase	   the	   burden	   of	   the	   appellate	   courts,	  while	   at	  
apex	   courts	   it	   may	   require	   triggering	   burdensome	   special	   procedures	   to	   unify	   such	  
divergent	  case	  law.119	  	  
                                            
112	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  virtually	  all	  courts	  where	  such	  a	  body	  exists.	  
113	  Czechia,	  Netherlands	  (court	  presidents	  influence	  composition	  of	  all	  chambers	  via	  Management	  Board	  presided	  
by	  them);	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  100;	  Mak,	  supra	  note	  89.	  	  
114	   Frank	   N.	   Cross	   &	   Stefanie	   Lindquist,	  Doctrinal	   and	   Strategic	   Influences	   of	   the	   Chief	   Justice:	   The	   Decisional	  
Significance	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  154	  UNIVESITY	  OF	  PENNSYLVANIA	  L.	  R.	  1665	  (2006);	  cited	  from	  Henrik	  Litleré	  Bentsen,	  
Court	  Leadership,	  Agenda	  Transformation,	  and	  Judicial	  Dissent,	  6	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LAW	  AND	  COURTS	  189,	  192	  (2018).	  
115	   David	   J.	   Danielski,	  Causes	   and	   Consequences	   of	   Conflict	   and	   Its	   Resolution	   in	   the	   Supreme	  Court,	   In	   JUDICIAL	  
CONFLICT	   AND	  CONSENSUS:	  BEHAVIORAL	   STUDIES	  OF	  AMERICAN	  APPELLATE	  COURTS	   (Sheldon	  Goldman	  &	  Charles	  M.	   Lamb	  
eds.,	  1986),	  at	  21;	  and	  Thomas	  G.	  Walker,	  Lee	  Epstein	  &	  William	  J.	  Dixon,	  On	  the	  Mysterious	  Demise	  of	  Consensual	  
Norms	   in	   the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court,	  50	   JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICS	  361	   (1988);	  both	  cited	  according	   to	  Bentsen,	  
supra	  note	  114,	  at	  191–192.	  
116	   C.	   L.	   Ostberg,	   Matthew	   E.	   Wetstein	   &	   Craig	   R.	   Ducat,	   Leaders,	   Followers,	   and	   Outsiders:	   Task	   and	   Social	  
Leadership	  on	  the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  the	  Early	  ‘Nineties,	  36	  POLITY	  505	  (2004);	  and	  Donald	  R.	  Songer,	  John	  
Szmer	  &	  Susan	  W.	  Johnson,	  Explaining	  Dissent	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada,	  44	  CANADIAN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICAL	  
SCIENCE	  389	  (2011);	  both	  cited	  according	  to	  Bentsen,	  supra	  note	  114,	  at	  192.	  
117	   Russel	   Smyth,	   Explaining	   Historical	   Dissent	   Rates	   in	   the	   High	   Court	   of	   Australia,	   41	   COMMONWEALTH	   AND	  
COMPARATIVE	   POLITICS	   83	   (2003);	   and	   Russel	   Smyth	   &	   Naryan	   Kumar	   Paresh,	  Hail	   to	   the	   Chief!	   Leadership	   and	  
Structural	  Change	  in	  the	  Level	  of	  Consensus	  on	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia,	  1	  JOURNAL	  OF	  EMPIRICAL	  LEGAL	  STUDIES	  399	  
(2004);	  both	  cited	  according	  to	  Bentsen,	  supra	  note	  114,	  at	  192.	  
118	  Bentsen,	  supra	  note	  114,	  at	  194–210.	  
119	  Such	  as	  referral	  of	  the	  case	  to	  the	  Grand	  Chamber	  at	  the	  ECtHR,	  see	  Çalı	  &	  Cunningham,	  supra	  note	  29;	  CJEU’s	  
President	  similarly	  wields	  substantive	  power	  regarding	  case	  assignment,	  see	  Krenn,	  supra	  note	  26.	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Sometimes	  court	  presidents	  may	  shape	  the	   jurisprudential	   image	  even	  by	  subtle	  changes	  
to	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  debate	  among	  judges.	  For	  instance,	  a	  court	  president	  may	  deliberately	  
change	   the	   internal	   institutional	  dynamics	  of	  her	   court	  by	   facilitating	  a	  more	  “academic”	  
style	  of	  deliberation	  in	  which	  conference	  discussions	  are	  expanded.120	  As	  a	  result,	  opinion	  
writing	   and	   circulation	   delays	   become	   more	   common	   and	   the	   judges	   may	   seize	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  reargue	  contentious	  cases.	  	  
	  
However,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  dark	  side	  of	  the	  court	  presidents’	  jurisprudential	  power.	  Instead	  of	  
shaping	   the	   law	   and	   persuading	   their	   colleagues	   to	   steer	   the	   courts	   according	   to	   their	  
jurisprudential	   vision,	   court	   presidents	   can	   misuse	   their	   powers	   and	   either	   silence	   the	  
critics	  or	  even	  attempt	   to	   influence	   the	  outcome	  of	   individual	   cases.	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	  
absence	  of	  separate	  opinions,	  by	  assigning	  a	  liberal	  judge	  to	  a	  three-­‐judge	  panel	  where	  she	  
will	  be	  regularly	  overruled	  by	  her	  conservative	  colleagues	  a	  court	  president	  can	  effectively	  
silence	   certain	   jurisprudential	   positions	   at	   the	   court.	   Similarly,	   by	   assigning	   a	   case	   to	   a	  
judge	  who	  a	  court	  president	  knows	  will	  decide	  it	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  be	  it	  out	  of	  that	  judge’s	  
political	  views121	  or	  sheer	  loyalty	  to	  the	  court	  president,	  the	  court	  president	  may	  bend	  the	  
case	   law	  in	  the	  direction	  she	  wants.	  To	  name	  one	  more	  example,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  
Slovak	   Supreme	   Court	   “contained”	   his	   critics	   in	   two	   chambers	   of	   the	   administrative	   law	  
division	   which	   dealt	   only	   with	   disputes	   with	   limited	   policy	   implications,	   and	   hence	   his	  
critics	  could	  not	  influence	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  important	  areas	  of	  law.122	  
In	   the	   worst	   case	   scenario,	   a	   court	   president	   may	   become	   a	   “transmission	   belt”123	   of	  
powerful	  political	  and	  business	  actors	  and	  rig	  the	  court	  according	  to	  their	  will.124	  
                                            
120	   This	   is	  what	   the	  Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	  U.S.	   Supreme	  Court	  Harlan	   Fisk	   Stone	  did	   in	   the	   1940’s,	  see	   PAMELA	   C.	  
CORLEY,	  AMY	  STEIGERWALT	  &	  ARTEMUS	  WARD,	  THE	  PUZZLE	  OF	  UNANIMITY:	  CONSENSUS	  ON	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  SUPREME	  COURT	  
(2013),	  cited	  according	  to	  Bentsen,	  supra	  note	  114,	  at	  192.	  Fifty	  years	  later,	  Carsten	  Smith	  did	  the	  same	  once	  he	  
became	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Norway,	  see	  Bentsen,	  supra	  note	  114,	  at	  196–198.	  
121	  Wood,	  Lanier,	  Keith	  &	  Ogundele,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  800	  and	  805–808,	  find	  that	  this	  so-­‐called	  attitudinal	  model	  
of	  case	  assignment	  is	  not	  supported	  by	  data	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States;	  but	  see	  also	  Maltzman	  &	  
Wahlbeck	  1996,	  at	  421–425;	  Maltzman	  &Wahlbeck	  2004;	  Maltzman;	  White;	  and	  Lax	  &	  Cameron,	  all	  supra	  note	  
34,	  who	  found	  that	  organizational	  needs	  are	  a	  strong	  factor	  in	  case	  assignment,	  but	  the	  attitudinal	  (i.e.	  ideological	  
proximity)	  factor	  also	  played	  some	  role.	  
122	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  320–321.	  
123	   The	   “transmission	   belt”	   metaphor	   suggests	   that	   court	   presidents,	   who	   could	   be	   recalled	   by	   the	   ruling	  
party/individual	  anytime	  at	  a	  whim,	  become	  the	  conduit	  of	   the	  ruling	  party/individual	   influence	  over	   individual	  
judges.	   The	  main	   role	   of	   the	   court	   presidents	   is	   then	   to	   “transmit”	   orders	   from	   the	   ruling	   party/individual	   to	  
individual	   judges	   in	   sensitive	   cases.	   See	   e.g.	   Kosař,	   supra	   note	   11,	   at	   101,	   105,	   117,	   and	   121–122;	   and	   Rachel	  
Ellett,	   Raul	   Sanchez	   Urribarri	   &	   Alexei	   Trochev,	   Chief	   Justice	   as	   a	   Political	   Agent:	   Evidence	   from	   Zambia,	  
Venezuela,	  and	  Ukraine,	  paper	  presented	  at	  the	  ECPR	  General	  Conference	  in	  Prague	  on	  9	  September	  2016	  (on	  file	  
with	  author).	  
124	  Popova,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  163;	  and	  Alexei	  Trochev,	  Meddling	  with	  Justice:	  Competitive	  Politics,	  Impunity,	  and	  
Distrusted	  Courts	  in	  Post-­‐Orange	  Ukraine,	  18	  DEMOKRATIZATSIYA	  122,	  133	  (2010).	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IV.	  Financial	  Power	  
	  
Resources	   are	   crucial	   for	   courts	   and	   judges	   alike,	   and	   equally	   crucial	   is	   the	   power	   to	  
distribute	  them.	  Courts	  need	  to	  finance	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  functioning,	  and	  it	  is	  often	  in	  the	  
hands	   of	   court	   presidents	   to	   manage	   the	   courts’	   budgets.125	   Furthermore,	   although	   it	  
would	  be	  surprising	   to	   find	  a	  country	  where	  court	  presidents	  have	  complete	  power	  over	  
judicial	   salaries,	   they	   often	   have	   at	   least	   some	   say	   in	   distributing	   salary	   supplements,	  
bonuses	  or	  other	  non-­‐monetary	  perks.126	  
	  
For	  example,	  in	  Russia	  and	  Ukraine	  court	  presidents	  decide	  on	  various	  ancillary	  issues	  such	  
as	   the	   allocation	   of	   subsidized	   housing	   and	   deciding	   on	   judges’	   vacation	   packages.	   As	  
judges	   in	   these	   two	   countries	   are	   often	   entitled	   to	   subsidized	   housing,	   and,	   since	   the	  
available	  housing	   is	  not	  unlimited	  and	  not	  all	  housing	   is	  equal,	   this	  perk	   is	  often	  used	  by	  
court	  presidents	  to	  please	  or	  intimidate	  judges.127	  “Disloyal”	  judges	  thus	  can	  be	  denied	  an	  
apartment	   for	   several	   years	   or	   “can	   suddenly	   face	   eviction	   or	   transfer	   to	   another	  
apartment,	   which	   in	   the	   best-­‐case	   scenario	   is	   a	   huge	   hassle”.128	   In	   fact,	   Russian	   and	  
Ukrainian	  court	  presidents	  have	  even	  wider	  powers	  and	  may	  help	  judges	  with	  other	  perks	  
that	  affect	   their	  well-­‐being,	  such	  as	   judges’	  vacation	  packages	  and	  access	   to	  day	  care	   for	  
their	  children.129	  	  
	  
The	  European	  countries	   covered	  by	   this	   special	   issue	   leave	  generally	   less	   room	   for	   court	  
presidents	   to	   affect	   the	   extrajudicial	   lives	   of	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	   judges,	   but	   in	   some	   post-­‐
communist	   countries,	   such	   as	   Slovakia,	   court	   presidents	   have	   managed	   and	   used	   these	  
non-­‐monetary	  benefits	  to	  reward	  and	  punish	  judges.130	  
	  
V.	  Ambassadorial	  Power	  
	  
Another	   important	  activity	  of	  court	  presidents	   is	   interaction	  with	  the	  outside	  world,	  be	   it	  
the	  public	  or	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  power,	  which	  they	  can	  use	  to	  lobby	  for	  their	  interests	  
or	   for	   the	   interests	   of	   their	   courts,	   the	   judicial	   branch	   or	   even	   their	   country.	   This	  
                                            
125	   This	   is	   the	   case	   of	   Czechia,	   or,	   to	   some	   degree,	   of	   Netherlands,	  where	   court	   presidents	   implement	   court’s	  
budget	   through	   the	  Management	  Boards;	  see	   Blisa,	   Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	   supra	   note	  89,	   and	  Mak,	   supra	  
note	  89.	  
126	  E.g.	  Slovakia,	  see	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  supra	  note	  77.	  
127	  See	  Popova,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  134.	  
128	  Id.	  
129	  See	  Solomon	  2010,	  above	  note	  41,	  at	  354;	  or	  Solomon	  2012,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  912.	  
130	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  361	  and	  369.	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“ambassadorial”	  power	  may	  stem	  both	   from	  their	   legally	  prescribed	  duties	  and	   from	  the	  
convention.	  This	  power	   is	  particularly	  elastic	  and	  depends	  heavily	  on	  the	  personality	  and	  
political	   savviness	   of	   the	   court	   president	   as	  well	   as	   on	   the	   respective	   political	   and	   legal	  
culture.	  
	  
For	  instance,	  the	  Presidents	  of	  both	  the	  CJEU131	  and	  the	  ECtHR132	  can	  serve	  as	  examples	  of	  
this	  power,	  as	  both	  of	   them	  are	   supposed	   to	   represent	   their	   courts,	  and	   indeed	  use	   this	  
role	   extensively.	   Similarly,	   virtually	   all	   major	   judicial	   figures	   in	   Australia,	   Canada,	   New	  
Zealand	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   engage	   in	   international	   diplomacy	   and	   regularly	   give	  
speeches	  primarily	  (but	  not	  exclusively)	  in	  other	  Commonwealth	  countries.133	  So	  does	  the	  
Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States	  who	  also	  publishes	  an	  annual	  year-­‐
end	  report	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  federal	   judiciary	   in	  which	  he	  can	  raise	  various	  issues	  to	  be	  
tackled	  by	   the	   judiciary	  and	  other	  branches.134	   Italy	   serves	  as	  yet	  another	  example.	  Here	  
the	  first	  president	  of	  the	  Corte	  Cassazione	  makes	  a	  speech	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  opening	  
of	  the	  judicial	  year	  in	  the	  presence	  of,	  among	  other	  dignitaries,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Italian	  
Republic	  and	  other	  key	  public	  officials.	  This	   is	  not	   just	  a	  ceremonial	  meeting	  as,	  after	  the	  
speech,	  the	  two	  go	   into	  a	  deep	  discussion	  on	  the	   issues	  related	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  
justice	  system.135	  	  
	  
However,	  ambassadorial	  power	  may	  sometimes	  put	  court	  presidents	  on	  a	  collision	  course	  
with	   political	   branches.	   This	   was	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Hungarian	   Supreme	   Court	   President	  
András	   Baka	  who	  was	   ex	   lege	   also	   the	   chairman	   of	   the	  National	   Judicial	   Council.	   As	   the	  
President	  of	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Justice,	  he	  was	  under	  an	  explicit	  statutory	  obligation	  to	  
express	   an	   opinion	   on	   draft	   legislation	   that	   affected	   the	   judiciary.136	   Once	   Viktor	   Orbán	  
presented	   his	   controversial	   judicial	   reforms,	   András	   Baka	   became	   a	   vocal	   critic	   of	   these	  
reforms	  and	  repeatedly	  addressed	  the	  Parliament	  and	  other	  bodies	  where	  he	  contended	  
                                            
131	  See	  Krenn,	  supra	  note	  26,	  and	  his	  description	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  then	  Court	  President	  Skouris	  in	  the	  institutional	  
reform	  of	  the	  General	  Court.	  Moreover,	  the	  CJEU’s	  Court	  President	  has	  the	  power	  to	  further	  shape	  the	  image	  of	  
the	  Court	  in	  that	  external	  activities	  of	  judges	  are	  subject	  to	  prior	  approval	  by	  their	  peers,	  and	  the	  Court	  President	  
has	  quite	  a	  significant	  say	  in	  this.	  
132	   Çalı	   &	   Cunningham,	   supra	   note	   29,	   describe	   the	   role	   of	   the	   then	   ECtHR’s	   President	   Jean-­‐Paul	   Costa	   in	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  Advisory	  Panel	  and	  the	  suggested	  influence	  over	  its	  composition.	  
133	  See	  e.	  g.	  P.	  Y.	  Lo,	  Chief	   Justice	  McLachlin	  and	  Hong	  Kong,	   I-­‐CONNECT	   (October	  1,	  2017),	  http://www.iconnect	  
blog.com/2017/12/lo-­‐on-­‐chief-­‐justice-­‐mclachlin/;	   for	   speeches	  of	   the	   Justices	  of	   the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  see	  
http://hcourt.gov.au/publications/speeches/speeches-­‐by-­‐current-­‐justices;	   for	   speeches	  by	   the	   judges	   from	  New	  
Zealand	  see	  https://courtsofnz.govt.nz/publications/speeches-­‐and-­‐papers;	  and	  others.	  
134	  See	  Chief	  Justice’s	  Year-­‐End	  Reports	  on	  the	  Federal	  Judiciary,	  https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-­‐
end/year-­‐endreports.aspx.	  
135	  Benvenuti	  &	  Paris,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
136	  Baka	  v.	  Hungary,	  supra	  note	  48,	  para	  44.	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that	  the	  new	  laws	  negatively	  affected	  the	  judiciary.	  Orbán’s	  regime	  apparently	  did	  not	  like	  
it	  and	  eventually	  passed	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  that	  de	  facto	  dismissed	  András	  Baka	  
from	   both	   functions	   and	   allowed	   Orbán	   to	   replace	   Baka	   with	   more	   loyal	   persons.137	   A	  
similar	  scenario	  has	  taken	  place	  in	  Poland,	  where	  the	  Law	  and	  Justice	  Party	  wants	  to	  get	  rid	  
of	  the	  Polish	  Supreme	  Court	  President,	  Małgorzata	  Gersdorf,138	  who	  stood	  up	  against	  the	  
attempts	  to	  curb	  the	  Supreme	  Court.139	  
	  
However,	   such	   firm	   stance	   against	   controversial	   judicial	   reforms	   may	   also	   increase	   the	  
ambassadorial	   power	   of	   court	   presidents	   abroad	   as	   they	   become	   a	   moral	   symbol	   of	  
defiance	   against	   the	   populist	   political	   leaders	   and	   their	   abusive	   techniques.	   It	   did	   not	  
eventually	  help	  András	  Baka,	  but	  the	  recent	  actions	  of	  the	  EU	  organs	  regarding	  the	  Polish	  
judicial	   reforms	   suggest	   that	   Małgorzata	   Gersdorf	   has	   used	   her	   ambassadorial	   power	  
well.140	  	  
	  
VI.	  Media	  Power	  
	  
Court	  presidents	  use	  a	  plethora	  of	  tools	  to	  communicate	  with	  various	  audiences,	  including	  
press	   releases,	   social	   media,	   special	   events,	   and	   YouTube.141	   They	   also	   enjoy	  
unprecedented	   access	   to	   the	  media	   as	   they	   are	   perceived	   as	   speaking	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	  
judiciary.	   By	   engaging	   with	   the	   journalistic	   press	   court	   presidents	   can	   even	   shape	   the	  
public	   image	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   For	   instance,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	  
Canada,	   Beverley	   McLachlin,	   regularly	   talks	   to	   the	   press,	   initiated	   a	   now-­‐traditional	  
question	  and	  answer	  with	  television	  media	   following	  her	  annual	  address	  at	   the	  Canadian	  
Bar	   Association,	   and	   hosts	   an	   annual	   open-­‐door	   celebration	   at	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   on	  
Canada	  Day.142	   She	  also	   learned	  how	   important	  media	  power	   is	  when	   she	  was	   forced	   to	  
                                            
137	  For	  further	  details,	  see	  Kosař	  &	  Šipulová2018,	  supra	  note	  1.	  
138	  See	  note	  5	  above.	  
139	  See	  note	  5	  above.	  
140	   See	   Case	   C 216/18	   PPU	  Minister	   for	   Justice	   and	   Equality	   v	  LM;	   and	   the	   “The	   CJEU’s	   Deficiency	   Judgment”	  
symposium	  at	  the	  Verfassungsblog	  (https://verfassungsblog.de/category/focus/after-­‐celmer-­‐focus/).	  See	  also	  the	  
other	  two	  pending	  cases	  initiated	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  before	  the	  CJEU	  (Case	  C-­‐192/18,	  Commission	  v.	  
Poland,	   pending;	   and	   Case	   C-­‐619/18,	   Commission	   v.	   Poland,	   pending).	   In	   December	   2017,	   the	   European	  
Commission	  also	  launched	  the	  so-­‐called	  Article	  7	  proceedings	  against	  Poland	  over	  changes	  to	  the	  judicial	  system.	  
141	   See.	   e.	   g.	   JEFFREY	   K.	   STATON,	   JUDICIAL	   POWER	   AND	   STRATEGIC	   COMMUNICATION	   IN	   MEXICO	   (2010);	   SHAI	   DOTHAN,	  
REPUTATION	   AND	   JUDICIAL	   TACTICS	   (2015);	   GEORG	  VANBERG,	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   CONSTITUTIONAL	   REVIEW	   IN	  GERMANY	   (2005);	  
Lawrence	   Baum,	   JUDGES	   AND	   THEIR	   AUDIENCES:	   A	   PERSPECTIVE	   ON	   JUDICIAL	   BEHAVIOR	   (2006);	   Olga	   Frishman,	   Court-­‐
Audience	  Relationships	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,	  MISSISSIPPI	  LAW	  JOURNAL	  (forthcoming);	  NUNO	  GAROUPA	  &	  TOM	  GINSBURG,	  
JUDICIAL	  REPUTATION:	  A	  COMPARATIVE	  THEORY	   (2017);	   the	  CCJE	  also	   lists	  “maintaining	  and	  developing	  relations	  with	  
other	  bodies	  and	  institutions“	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  roles	  of	  the	  court	  president,	  see	  supra	  note	  49.	  
142	  Lawrence	  David,	  The	  Face	  of	  and	  Institution:	  Beverly	  McLachlin’s	  Reinvention	  of	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  
Canada,	   I-­‐CONNECT	   (December	   8,	   2017),	   http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/12/david-­‐on-­‐chief-­‐justice-­‐
mclachlin/.	  
2018	   Court	  Presidents:	  Missing	  Piece	  in	  the	  Puzzle	  of	  Judicial	  Governance	   2053	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
defend	  herself	  against	  allegations	  by	  the	  then	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Canada,	  Stephen	  J.	  Harper,	  
of	  having	  improperly	  interfered	  with	  the	  nomination	  of	  Marc	  J.	  Nadon,143	  a	  Federal	  Court	  
of	   Appeal	   judge	   who	   was	   later	   disqualified	   from	   appointment	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   his	  
ineligibility	   for	  one	  of	  three	  Supreme	  Court	  seats	  reserved	  for	  the	  province	  of	  Quebec.144	  
The	  witty	  use	  of	  media	  power	  is	  no	  less	  important	  in	  emerging	  democracies.145	  
	  
In	  Europe,	  court	  presidents	  are	  also	  vocal	  in	  the	  media.	  Presidents	  of	  supranational	  courts	  
have	   been	   particularly	   active	   in	   this	   regard.	   Koen	   Lenaerts,	   the	   president	   of	   the	   CJEU,	  
regularly	  provides	  interviews	  and	  engages	  with	  the	  press.146	  Most	  ECtHR	  presidents	  do	  so	  
too.	   Luzius	   Wildhaber	   and	   Jean-­‐Paul	   Costa	   were	   particularly	   outspoken	   in	   press	  
conferences	  and	  interviews.147	  Domestic	  court	  presidents	  have	  not	  been	  left	  behind.	  They	  
often	   employ	   press	   officers	   to	   handle	   the	   media	   for	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   information	   about	   the	  
outcomes	  of	  cases,148	  but	  they	  make	  sure	  that	  these	  press	  releases	  are	  coherent	  with	  their	  
vision	  of	  their	  court.	  However,	  the	  media	  power	  of	  court	  presidents	  often	  goes	  further.	  For	  
instance,	  the	  Czech	  apex	  court	  presidents	  receive	  substantial	  media	  attention	  that	  they	  use	  
to	   gather	   political	   support	   as	   well	   as	   a	   tool	   in	   the	   interaction	   with	   political	   actors.149	  
Sometimes	  court	  presidents	  use	  the	  media	  to	  expose	  disagreement	  among	  themselves150	  
                                            
143	  Sean	  Fine,	  The	  secret	  short	  list	  that	  provoked	  the	  rift	  between	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  PMO,	  THE	  GLOBE	  AND	  MAIL	  (May	  
23,	   2014),	   https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/the-­‐secret-­‐short-­‐list-­‐that-­‐caused-­‐a-­‐rift-­‐between-­‐
chief-­‐justice-­‐and-­‐pmo/article18823392/.	  	  
144	  Reference	  re	  Supreme	  Court	  Act,	  ss.	  5	  and	  6,	  [2014]	  1	  S.C.R.	  433,	  2014	  SCC	  21.	  For	  further	  details,	  see	  Carissima	  
Mathen.	   The	   Shadow	   of	   Absurdity	   and	   the	   Challenge	   of	   Easy	   Cases:	   Looking	   Back	   on	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   Act	  
Reference,	  71	  SUPREME	  COURT	  LAW	  REVIEW	  161	  (2015).	  
145	  See	  e.g.	  Stefanus	  Hendrianto,	  The	  Puzzle	  of	  Judicial	  Communication	  in	  Indonesia:	  The	  Media,	  the	  Court,	  and	  the	  
Chief	  Justice,	  In	  JUSTICES	  AND	  JOURNALISTS:	  THE	  GLOBAL	  PERSPECTIVE	  141	  (Richard	  Davis	  &	  David	  Taras	  eds.,	  2017).	  	  
146	  See	  e.g.	  Duncan	  Robinson	  &	  Alex	  Barker,	  EU’s	   top	   judge	  defends	  ECJ	  against	  charges	  of	   integration	  agenda,	  
FINANCIAL	  TIMES	  (November	  22,	  2016),	  https://www.ft.com/content/0e132ef8-­‐af0c-­‐11e6-­‐a37c-­‐f4a01f1b0fa1.	  
147	  WOJCIECH	  SADURSKI,	  CONSTITUTIONALISM	  AND	  THE	  ENLARGEMENT	  OF	  EUROPE	  (2012),	  at	  1.	  For	  Wildhaber’s	  vision	  of	  the	  
Strasbourg	  Court,	  see	  Luzius	  Wildhaber,	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  The	  Past,	  The	  Present,	  The	  Future.	  
22	  AMERICAN	  UNIVERSITY	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  REVIEW	  521	  (2007).	  
148	  E.	  g.	  Germany,	  see	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  506.	  	  
149	  The	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court’s	  President,	  Josef	  Baxa,	  is	  a	  regular	  guest	  of	  radio	  show	  called	  How	  He	  Sees	  
It,	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court’s	  Chief	  Justice	  Pavel	  Rychetský	  frequently	  gives	  interviews	  on	  topics	  ranging	  from	  
the	  judicial	  to	  the	  purely	  political	  ones;	  see	  e.	  g.	  Martin	  Biben	  &	  Markéta	  Šrajbrová,	  Prezident	  nemůže	  protahovat	  
vládnutí	   kabinetu	   bez	   důvěry	   neomezeně,	   HOSPODÁŘSKÉ	   NOVINY	   (November	   1,	   2017),	   https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-­‐
65935270-­‐prezident-­‐nemuze-­‐protahovat-­‐vladnuti-­‐kabinetu-­‐bez-­‐duvery-­‐neomezene-­‐hrozi-­‐mu-­‐ustavni-­‐zaloba-­‐
tvrdi-­‐rychetsky;	   or	   Kristýna	   Novotná,	  Mám	   obavy	   ze	   Zemanovy	   kohorty	   panošů,	   Ovčáčka	   by	   měli	   na	   hodinu	  
vyhodit,	   říká	   šéf	   Ústavního	   soudu	   Rychetský,	   IROZHLAS	   (January	   8,	   2018),	   https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-­‐
domov/pavel-­‐rychetskymilos-­‐zemanjiri-­‐ovcacek_1801080600_ogo.	  Note	  that	  in	  the	  polls	  assessing	  the	  popularity	  
of	  public	  officials,	  Rychetský	  often	  comes	  out	  on	  top	  of	  the	  ladder.	  
150	  Franck	  Johannès,	  Le	  premier	  président	  de	  la	  Cour	  de	  cassation	  s’inquiète	  du	  pouvoir	  croissant	  du	  Conseil	  d’Etat,	  
LE	  MONDE	  (December	  21,	  2015),	  https://www.lemonde.fr/police-­‐justice/article/2015/12/21/le-­‐premier-­‐president-­‐
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and	  even	  to	  criticize	  each	  other.	  The	  rapid	  development	  of	  social	  media	  such	  as	  Facebook	  
or	  Twitter	  also	  provided	  court	  presidents	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  further	  boost	  their	  media	  
power,	   because	   they	   can	   use	   the	   new	   platforms	   to	   communicate	   directly	   with	   their	  
intended	  audiences	  and	  set	  their	  agenda	  without	  the	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  traditional	  media	  to	  
“get	  it	  right”.151	  
	  
VII.	  Ancillary	  Powers	  
	  
In	  some	  countries	  court	  presidents	  also	  have	  various	  ancillary	  powers	  that	  do	  not	  directly	  
concern	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	  or	  the	  functioning	  of	  their	  courts	  stricto	  sensu	  and	  cannot	  
be	  put	   into	  some	  of	  the	  categories	  mentioned	  above.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  
these	   powers	   are	   negligible.	   For	   instance,	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	  
Canada,	   beyond	   her	   additional	   roles,	   also	   chairs	   the	   committee	   which	   advises	   the	  
Governor	  General	  on	  awards	  of	  membership	  of	  the	  Order	  of	  Canada152	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Board	  
of	   Governors	   of	   the	   National	   Judicial	   Institute,	   which	   develops	   and	   delivers	   various	  
educational	   programs	   for	   all	   Canada's	   federal,	   provincial	   and	   territorial	   judges.153	  
Furthermore,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  appoints	  a	  substitute	  Chief	  
Electoral	  Officer	   in	   case	  of	  her	  negligence	  or	  death	  or	   incapacity	  while	  Parliament	   is	   not	  
sitting.154	   What	   is	   more,	   should	   the	   Governor	   General	   die,	   become	   incapacitated,	   be	  
removed	  or	  be	  absent	   from	  the	  country	   for	  a	  period	  of	  more	   than	  one	  month,	   the	  Chief	  
Justice	   would	   become	   the	   Administrator	   of	   Canada	   and	   exercise	   all	   the	   powers	   and	  
authorities	  of	  the	  Governor	  General.155	  
	  
Importantly,	   court	   presidents	   often	   sit	   on	   or	   even	   chair	   JSG	   bodies.	   In	   the	   Netherlands,	  
court	   presidents	   chair	   the	   management	   boards	   established	   at	   each	   court.156	   Similarly,	  
Slovenian	   court	   presidents	   preside	   over	   personnel	   councils.157	   In	   Ireland,	   the	   Judicial	  
                                                                                                                
de-­‐la-­‐cour-­‐de-­‐cassation-­‐s-­‐inquiete-­‐du-­‐pouvoir-­‐croissant-­‐du-­‐conseil-­‐d-­‐etat_4835887_1653578.html.	   For	   further	  
background	   of	   this	   rare	   public	   disagreement	   between	   the	   First	   President	   of	   the	   French	   Cour	   de	   Cassation	  
Bertrand	   Louvel	   and	   the	   Vice-­‐President	   of	   Conseil	   d’État	   over	   the	   dualism	   of	   the	   French	   judiciary,	   see	  Marie-­‐
Christine	   de	   Montecler,	   Duel	   à	   distance	   sur	   le	   dualisme	   juridictionnel,	   DALLOZ	   ACTUALITE	   (July	   28,	   2017),	  
https://www.dalloz-­‐actualite.fr/flash/duel-­‐distance-­‐sur-­‐dualisme-­‐juridictionnel#.W-­‐vVLeKNzjw.	  	  
151	  See	  e.	  g.	  the	  Twitter	  account	  of	  the	  Czech	  SAC’s	  President	  Josef	  Baxa,	  at	  https://twitter.com/josefbaxa2.	  
152	  David,	  supra	  note	  142.	  
153	  Id.	  
154	  Canada	  Elections	  Act,	  S.C.	  2000,	  c.9,	  s.	  14(1).	  
155	   About	   the	   Judges,	   SUPREME	   COURT	   OF	   CANADA	   (August	   28,	   2017),	   http://www.scc-­‐csc.ca/judges-­‐juges/about-­‐
apropos-­‐eng.aspx.	  
156	  Mak,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
157	  Avbelj,	  supra	  note	  76.	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Appointments	  Advisory	  Board	   (JAAB)	   is	   chaired	  by	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  and	   the	  president	  of	  
each	  court	  is	  a	  member	  ex	  officio,	  which	  gives	  court	  presidents	  a	  significant	  influence	  in	  the	  
JAAB.158	  In	  Germany,	  court	  presidents	  sit	  on	  presidia,	  councils	  of	  judicial	  appointment	  and	  
in	   some	   Länder	   even	   on	   committees	   for	   the	   selection	   of	   judges.159	   The	   President	   of	   the	  
Supreme	  Court	  presides	  over	  the	  judicial	  councils	  in	  Spain160	  and	  France.161	  	  
	  
In	  contrast,	   the	  CEE	  countries	   initially	  allowed	  court	  presidents	   to	  sit	  on	   judicial	  councils,	  
but	   then	  they	   retreated	  due	  to	  problems	  with	   the	  accumulation	  of	   too	  much	  power.	  For	  
instance,	  Poland	  banned	  court	  presidents	  from	  membership	  of	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  the	  
Judiciary	  in	  2007.162	  The	  Slovak	  Parliament	  adopted	  the	  same	  incompatibility	  rule	  in	  2011,	  
and	   later	   on	   even	   stripped	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   President	   of	   chairmanship	   of	   the	   judicial	  
council.163	   Until	   2014	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	   Slovak	   Supreme	   Court	   also	   chaired	   the	  
Judicial	   Council	   of	   the	   Slovak	  Republic.	  Only	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	   authoritative	   rule	  of	   the	  
Supreme	  Court	  President,	  Štefan	  Harabin,	  who	  used	  the	  carrots	  to	  reward	  his	  allies	  within	  
the	   judiciary	  and	  ruthlessly	  employed	  the	  available	  sticks	  against	  his	  critics,	  Slovakia	  split	  
these	  two	  positions	  among	  two	  different	  persons.164	  To	  make	  things	  even	  more	  complex,	  
the	  separation	  of	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  judicial	  council	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  
of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  can	  also	  be	  abused,	  as	  the	  Baka	  case	  attests.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  
the	   regime	   of	   Viktor	   Orbán	   used	   the	   need	   to	   separate	   these	   two	   offices	   as	   a	   lame	  
justification	  to	  dismiss	  András	  Baka	  from	  both	  of	  these	  functions.165	  
	  
VIII.	  The	  Holistic	  View	  of	  Court	  Presidents’	  Powers	  
	  
Even	  though	  we	  unpacked	  the	  power	  of	  court	  presidents	   into	  seven	  smaller	  components	  
for	  the	  sake	  of	  deeper	  analysis,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  isolated	  from	  each	  other.	  
On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  are	  interconnected	  and	  have	  a	  synergic	  effect.	  For	  instance,	  if	  court	  
presidents	  enjoy	  great	  powers	  regarding	  the	  careers	  of	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	   judges,	   this	  will	  also	  
likely	   enhance	   their	   jurisprudential	   power.	   Similarly,	   strong	   administrative	   and	   financial	  
                                            
158	  O’Brien,	  supra	  note	  70.	  
159	  Wittreck,	  supra	  note	  92.	  
160	  See	  Aida	  Torres	  Pérez,	  Judicial	  self-­‐government	  and	  judicial	  independence:	  the	  political	  capture	  of	  the	  General	  
Council	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  in	  Spain,	  in	  this	  issue.	  
161	  Vauchez,	  supra	  note	  78.	  
162	  See	  Adam	  Bodnar	  &	  Lukasz	  Bojarski,	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  Poland,	  In	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  673.	  
163	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Slovakia	  during	  the	  era	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  Štefan	  Harabin	  (2009–2014).	  See	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  
&	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  77;	  and	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9.	  
164	  See	  supra	  notes	  1	  and	  136–137.	  
165	  See	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  77.	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powers	   may	   also	   increase	   court	   presidents’	   leverage	   over	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	   judges.166	   A	  
broader	   jurisprudential	   power	  may	   then	   buttress	   the	   court	   president’s	  media	   power.	   In	  
another	  scenario,	  strong	  media	  power	  gives	  court	  presidents	  significant	  leverage	  over	  the	  
bodies	  formally	  vested	  with	  the	  power	  to	  select	  and	  promote	   judges	  that	   in	  turn	  may	  be	  
forced	  to	  respect	  court	  presidents’	  views	  regarding	  the	  selection	  of	  candidates	  for	  judicial	  
office	  and	  their	  subsequent	  promotion.167	  As	  a	  result,	  selected	  candidates,	  handpicked	  by	  
court	  presidents,	  may	  feel	   that	   they	  “owe”	  something	  to	  their	  court	  presidents	   for	  being	  
shortlisted	   and	   appointed.	   This	   may	   create	   a	   certain	   bond	   of	   loyalty168	   which	   court	  
presidents	  can	   later	  on	  exploit	   in	  order	  to	  bolster	  their	   jurisprudential	  and	  administrative	  
powers.	  	  
	  
These	  relationships	  between	  the	  various	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  are	  complex	  and	  we	  
do	  not	  intend	  to	  make	  any	  causal	  claims	  here	  as	  this	  would	  require	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  study	  
of	   selected	   jurisdictions.	   Such	   study	   would	   also	   need	   to	   analyze	   the	   contingent	  
circumstances169	   of	   court	   presidents’	   powers	   in	   each	   jurisdiction	   and	   explore	   alternative	  
explanations.	  We	  merely	  point	  out	  that	  these	  relationships	  exist	  and	  should	  be	  addressed	  
in	  future	  research.170	  	  
	  	  
C.	  How	  Strong	  are	  Court	  Presidents	  in	  Europe?	  
	  
In	  Part	  B	  of	  this	  article,	  we	  developed	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents.	  In	  doing	  
so	  we	  built	  on	  the	  contributions	  in	  this	  special	   issue	  as	  well	  as	  on	  examples	  from	  all	  over	  
the	   globe.	   In	   this	   Part	   we	   narrow	   the	   number	   of	   studied	   jurisdictions	   to	   thirteen	   and	  
develop	   a	   “Court	   Presidents	   Power	   Index”.	   These	   jurisdictions	   include	   12	   jurisdictions	  
covered	   by	   this	   special	   issue	   (CJEU,	   Czechia,	   ECtHR,	   France,	   Germany,	   Ireland,	   Italy,	   the	  
Netherlands,	   Poland,	   Romania,	   Slovakia,	   and	   Slovenia)	   and	   Russia.171	   By	   developing	   the	  
“Court	  Presidents	  Power	  Index”	  we	  get	  an	  approximate	  picture	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  court	  
presidents	   in	   the	   studied	   jurisdictions.	  Moreover,	   our	   index	   allows	   us	   to	   identify	   several	  
five	   types	   of	   court	   presidents	   (court	   president	   as	   a	   boss,	   court	   president	   as	   a	   judicial	  
leader,	   court	   president	   as	   a	   manager,	   court	   president	   as	   a	   judicial	   diplomat,	   and	   court	  
president	  as	  a	  primus	   inter	  pares)	  and	  revisit	   the	  claim	  that	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  
view	  the	  roles	  of	  court	  presidents	  differently.	  
                                            
166	  This	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Slovakia	  during	  the	  era	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  Štefan	  Harabin	  (2009–2014).	  See	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  
&	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  77;	  and	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9.	  
167	  This	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  Czechia	  since	  the	  late	  1990s.	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  11.	  
168	  Note	  that	  court	  presidents	  may	  build	  such	  loyalty	  by	  other	  means	  as	  well	  –	  for	  instance,	  by	  a	  selective	  use	  of	  
administrative	  power	  or	  by	  not	  initiating	  the	  disciplinary	  motion	  against	  a	  judge	  who	  deserves	  it.	  
169	  See	  Part	  D.	  
170	  For	  potential	  avenues	  for	  future	  research	  see	  Part	  E.	  
171	  For	  explanation,	  why	  we	  omitted	  Spain	  and	  Turkey	  and	  why	  we	  added	  Russia,	  see	  below.	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I.	  Towards	  the	  “Court	  Presidents	  Power	  Index”	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   tentatively	   compare	   the	   strength	   of	   court	   presidents,	   we	   created	   a	   simple	  
ordinal	  index	  of	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  (“Court	  Presidents	  Power	  Index”).	  We	  included	  
every	  jurisdiction	  covered	  by	  this	  special	  issue	  about	  which	  we	  have	  a	  reasonable	  amount	  
of	  information	  regarding	  the	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents,	  either	  from	  the	  contributions	  to	  
this	  special	  issue	  or	  from	  additional	  sources.172	  We	  also	  added	  Russia	  to	  the	  mix,	  because	  
Russian	  court	  presidents	  wield	  more	  power	  than	   in	  any	  European	   jurisdiction	  covered	  by	  
this	  special	  issue.173	  This	  should	  allow	  us	  to	  see	  the	  strength	  of	  European	  court	  presidents	  
in	  a	  better	  perspective.	  	  
	  
As	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  index	  itself,	  we	  take	  six	  out	  of	  seven174	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  
discussed	  in	  Part	  B175	  and	  then	  we	  rate	  court	  presidents	  in	  each	  jurisdiction	  depending	  on	  
the	   extent	   of	   their	   competences	   in	   each	   of	   these	   six	   areas.	   We	   use	   a	   three-­‐level	   scale	  
(extensive,	   intermediate	  and	  minimal	  power).	  Therefore	  for	  each	  power	  we	  rate	  whether	  
the	   power	   wielded	   by	   the	   court	   presidents	   in	   each	   area	   is	   extensive,	   intermediate	   or	  
minimal.176	   If	   the	   power	   is	   extensive,	   a	   country	   is	   given	   3	   points,	   if	   the	   powers	   is	  
intermediate,	  a	  country	  is	  given	  2	  points,	  and	  if	  the	  power	  is	  minimal,	  a	  country	  is	  allocated	  
1	  point.	  	  
	  
The	  decisive	  criterion	  for	  the	  rating	  is	  the	  consequentiality	  of	  the	  power	  given	  to	  the	  court	  
president.	  Therefore,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  power	  over	  judicial	  careers,	  court	  presidents	  who	  
play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   selecting,	   promoting	   and	   disciplining	   judges	   have	   extensive	  
powers.	   Those	   court	   presidents	   who	   have	   the	   power	   to	   evaluate	   judges	   that	   can	   have	  
repercussions	   for	   their	   potential	   career	   advancement	   or	   decide	   on	   the	   composition	   of	  
another	   body	   that	   plays	   a	   key	   role	   in	   selecting	   judges	   have	   intermediate	   powers.	   In	  
contrast,	   court	   presidents	   who	   can	   influence	   selection	   and	   promotion	   only	   indirectly,	  
either	  through	  having	  a	  say	  in	  one	  of	  the	  many	  bodies	  involved	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  judges	  or	  
through	   indirect	   influence	   over	   the	   promotion	   of	   judges,	   have	  minimal	   power.	   Similarly,	  
                                            
172	   That	   is	   why	  we	   omit	   Spain	   and	   Turkey,	   because	  we	   simply	   do	   not	   have	   sufficient,	   relevant	   and	   accessible	  
information	  on	  Spanish	  and	  Turkish	  court	  presidents.	  
173	  See	  also	  Solomon	  2012,	  supra	  note	  41;	  Solomon,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  354;	  Schwartz	  &	  Sykiainen,	  supra	  note	  36,	  in	  
particular	  at	  995–996,	  1003,	  1008–1009,	  1012,	  1018–1027	  and	  1031–1034;	  Popova,	  supra	  note	  17.	  
174	  For	  pragmatic	  purposes,	  we	  leave	  aside	  the	  ancillary	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  as	  we	  do	  not	  have	  sufficient	  
information	  about	  them	  and	  they	  are	  often	  incommensurable.	  
175	  We	   include	  both	   formal	  and	   informal	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents,	  as	   in	  many	  cases	   the	   informal	  powers	  are	  
interlinked	  with	  the	  formal	  ones	  and	  may	  be	  even	  more	  consequential.	  
176	  This	  categorization	  is	  inspired	  by	  the	  table	  in	  Nuno	  Garoupa	  &	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  Guarding	  the	  Guardians:	  Judicial	  
Councils	  and	  Judicial	  Independence,	  57	  AM.	  J.	  COMP.	  L.	  103,	  122	  (2009).	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extensive	  administrative	  power	   involves	  a	  direct	   influence	  on	  case	  assignment	  and	  panel	  
composition,	   while	   the	   power	   to	   create	   work	   schedules	   would	   give	   court	   presidents	  
intermediate	  power	  and	  the	  supervision	  of	  automatic	  case	  assignment	  counts	  as	  a	  minimal	  
one.	  By	   repeating	   this	   exercise	   for	   each	  of	   the	   six	  powers	  of	   court	  presidents	  we	  get	   an	  
approximate	  picture	  of	  their	  strength	  in	  the	  studied	  jurisdictions.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  rating	  
can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  1	  below.	  	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Court	  Presidents	  Power	  Index:	  Typology	  of	  Powers	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Powers	  	  
	  Area	  
Extensive	   Intermediate	   Minimal	  
Judicial	  Careers	  
CZ,	  RU,	  SLO,	  SVK	  
(significant	  role	  in	  
selection,	  promotion,	  or	  
disciplining	  of	  judges)	  
IRE,	  FR,	  RO,	  PL	  




CJEU,	  ECtHR	  (both	  
weak	  influence	  
over	  one	  of	  the	  
bodies	  involved	  in	  




judges),	  NL,	  IT	  
Administrative	  
FR	  (discretionary	  case	  
assignment),	  CJEU	  
(discretionary	  case	  
assignment),	  CZ,	  IT	  (panel	  
assignment	  +	  work	  
schedules),	  RU,	  PL,	  SLO	  
SVK,	  IRE	  (work	  
schedules,	  
managing	  courts	  










RU	  (powers	  over	  bonuses,	  
kindergartens	  and	  flats)	  	  
SLO	  (deciding	  on	  
education,	  
conferences),	  SVK,	  
FR	  (power	  over	  
salary	  bonuses)	  
CZ,	  IT,	  NL,	  GER,	  PL,	  
IRE,	  RO,	  CJEU,	  
ECtHR	  
(power	  over	  court	  
budgets)	  
Jurisprudential	  
CZ,	  SVK,	  PL,	  RU,	  CJEU	  
(opinion	  assignment	  +	  
additional	  resources)	  
ECtHR	  
SLO,	  GER,	  IRE,	  FR,	  
IT,	  RO,	  NL	  
Ambassadorial	  
ECtHR,	  CJEU,	  RU	  
(represent	  judiciary,	  
communicate	  with	  the	  
executive/other	  organs)	  
	  
PL,	  CZ,	  IRE,	  SLO,	  
GER	  
IT	  (opening	  of	  the	  
judicial	  year),	  NL	  
(speeches),	  FR,	  RO,	  
SVK	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Media	   CJEU,	  ECtHR,	  CZ,	  SLO	   RU	   SVK,	  GER,	  PL,	  IRE,	  NL,	  FR,	  IT,	  RO	  
Ancillary	   Not	  studied	   Not	  studied	   Not	  studied	  
	  
After	  rating	  each	  of	  the	  court	  presidents’	  powers	  in	  the	  respective	  jurisdictions,	  we	  added	  
them	   up	   and	   created	   a	   ranking	   of	   the	   jurisdictions	   according	   to	   their	   court	   presidents’	  
strengths.	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Court	  Presidents	  Power	  Index:	  Overall	  Strength	  of	  Court	  Presidents	  
	  
Country	   Power	  Index	  
Russia	   17	  
Czechia	   15	  
Slovenia	   14	  





France	   10	  
Ireland	   9	  






We	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  Court	  Presidents	  Power	  Index	  is	  still	  tentative	  and	  should	  
be	   approached	   with	   caution.	   This	   is	   so	   not	   only	   due	   to	   the	   scarce	   literature	   on	   court	  
presidents	  and	  lack	  of	  empirical	  data,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  volatile	  nature	  of	  their	  powers	  
changes	   over	   time.177	   Not	   only	   do	   the	   powers	   change	   over	   time,	   but	   they	   also	   greatly	  
                                            
177	   See	   e.g.	   the	   recent	   developments	   in	   Poland	   and	   Hungary.	   However,	   court	   presidents’	   powers	   have	   been	  
subject	  to	  changes	  also	  in	  Czechia,	  Ireland,	  Slovakia,	  as	  well	  at	  the	  CJEU	  and	  the	  ECtHR.	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depend	   upon	   the	   respective	   court	   presidents’	   ability	   and	   willingness	   to	   use	   them.178	  
Therefore,	   our	   index	   should	   be	   viewed	   rather	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   identifying	   broader	  
trends	  and	  discovering	  various	  configurations	  of	   court	  presidents’	  powers	   that	  exist	  over	  
Europe.	  
	  
Despite	   the	  abovementioned	   limitations,	  Tables	  1	  and	  2	  reveal	  some	   interesting	   insights.	  
Court	  presidents	  with	  the	  most	  extensive	  powers	  operate	  in	  Russia	  (17	  points),	  followed	  by	  
Czechia,	  Slovenia,	  and	  at	  the	  CJEU	  (14	  to	  15	  points).	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  continuum	  lie	  
the	  Netherlands,	  Romania,	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  Ireland	  (7	  to	  9	  points).	  In	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  
Table	  2	  we	  can	  find	  France,	  the	  ECtHR,	  Poland,	  and	  Slovakia	  (10	  to	  12	  points).	  Russia	  lives	  
up	   to	   the	   strongman	   archetype	   and	   Russian	   court	   presidents	  wield	   extensive	   powers	   in	  
each	   area.	   However,	   the	   rest	   of	   Table	   2	   defies	   straightforward	   interpretation.	   Most	  
importantly,	  we	  cannot	  simply	  conclude	  that	  Eastern	  court	  presidents	  are	  always	  stronger	  
than	   their	  Western	   European	   counterparts,179	   because	   the	   CJEU	   President	   is	   one	   of	   the	  
most	  powerful	  and	  post-­‐communist	  countries	  are	  actually	  represented	  not	  only	  at	  the	  top	  
of	  Table	  2,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  middle	  and	  even	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  ranking.	  	  
	  
As	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   Court	   President	   Power	   Index	   allows	   us	   to	   analyze	   various	  
configurations	  of	  court	  presidents’	  powers	  and	  identify	  types	  of	  court	  presidents	  in	  Europe.	  
Two	  types	  of	  court	  presidents	  emerge	  clearly	  from	  our	  Index	  –	  a	  court	  president	  as	  primus	  
inter	  pares	   and	  a	   court	  president	  as	  a	  boss.	   In	   the	   first	   type,	   the	   “first	   among	  equals”,	   a	  
court	  president	  has	  limited	  influence	  over	  the	  careers	  and	  financial	  well-­‐being	  of	  individual	  
judges,	   has	   limited	   influence	   on	   case	   assignment	   and	   usually	   shares	   her	   administrative	  
powers	  with	  other	  bodies,	  and	  instead	  relies	  primarily	  on	  her	  leadership	  skills.	  Such	  court	  
presidents	   also	   tend	   to	   be	   less	   visible	   in	   the	   media	   and	   do	   not	   play	   the	   major	  
ambassadorial	   role.	   	   This	   type	   of	   court	   presidency	   has	   often	   been	   associated	   with	   the	  
common	  law	  world.180	  	  
	  
From	  our	  thirteen	  jurisdictions,	  Germany	  comes	  arguably	  closest	  to	  the	  primus	  inter	  pares	  
type.181	   Post-­‐war	  German	   jurists	  have	  placed	  a	   strong	  emphasis	  on	   the	   independence	  of	  
individual	   judges	  and	  set	  the	  strict	   limits	  on	  how	  court	  presidents	  may	   interact	  with	  rank	  
and	  file	  judges.	  Cases	  are	  assigned	  strictly	  on	  random	  basis	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  set	  in	  
advance.182	   Even	   the	   general	   rules	   on	   the	   case	   assignment	   are	   not	   stipulated	   by	   court	  
                                            
178	  We	  address	  this	  issue	  in	  Part	  D	  below.	  	  
179	  We	  address	  this	  issue	  in	  Part	  D	  below.	  	  
180	  Solomon,	  supra	  note	  41;	  Lawrence	  David,	  The	  Face	  of	  an	  Institution:	  Beverley	  McLachlin’s	  Reinvention	  of	  the	  
Role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  Canada,	  I-­‐CONNECT,	  (December	  7,	  2017)	  http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/12/david	  
-­‐on-­‐chief-­‐justice-­‐mclachlin/.	  
181	  For	  a	  similar	  opinion,	  see	  also	  Solomon,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  918.	  	  
182	  See	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  481–483.	  
2018	   Court	  Presidents:	  Missing	  Piece	  in	  the	  Puzzle	  of	  Judicial	  Governance	   2061	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
presidents,	  but	  by	  the	  Judicial	  Board	  (Präsidium)	  of	  each	  court.	  Though	  the	  court	  president	  
is	   a	   member	   of	   this	   board,	   regular	   judges	   have	   a	   majority	   there.183	   Moreover,	   regular	  
judges	   can	   challenge	   the	   assignment	   of	   a	   particular	   case	   before	   administrative	   courts	   if	  
they	   believe	   that	   the	   rules	   of	   case	   assignment	   were	   breached.184	   The	   Judicial	   Service	  
Courts	  have	  also	  forbidden	  court	  presidents	  from	  making	  any	  remarks	  that	  might	  influence	  
the	  future	  performance	  of	  judges,	  even	  on	  matters	  on	  case	  management	  and	  efficiency.185	  
Similarly,	  any	  evaluation	  of	  judges	  must	  deal	  only	  with	  the	  outer	  order	  of	  judicial	  business,	  
and	  not	   its	   core,	   or	  how	   the	   law	   is	   applied.186	   The	  only	   area	   are	  where	   court	  presidents	  
have	   arguably	   retained	   their	   informal	   powers	   is	   promotion	   as	   several	   commentators	  
suggest	  that	  German	  judges	  who	  seek	  promotion	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  adjust	  their	  decision-­‐
making	  according	  to	  the	  views	  of	  their	  court	  presidents.187	  	  
	  
Similarly,	   the	   powers	   of	   Dutch	   court	   presidents	   have	   been	   diluted	   over	   time.	   They	   no	  
longer	  act	  alone,	  but	   chair	   the	   three-­‐member	  Management	  Board,	  which	  decides	  on	   the	  
division	   of	   the	   court	   into	   chambers,	   the	   allocation	   of	   cases,	   and	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  
management,	   organization	   and	   operations	   of	   the	   court.188	   Dutch	   court	   presidents	   thus	  
have	  rather	  limited	  influence	  over	  the	  lives	  and	  careers	  of	  individual	  judges.	  	  
	  
Interestingly,	   Romanian	   court	   presidents	   also	   seem	   to	   be	   rather	   weak.189	   They	   serve	   a	  
relatively	   short	   three-­‐year	   mandate	   (once	   renewable),	   have	   no	   influence	   on	   case	  
assignment	   as	   they	  merely	   supervise	   the	   system	   of	   random	   case	   assignment,	   and	   have	  
mainly	  court	  administration	  competencies.190	  They	  have	  limited	  influence	  over	  the	  career	  
of	  rank	  and	  file	  judges,	  as	  their	  only	  real	  power	  is	  having	  a	  say	  in	  periodical	  evaluation	  of	  
judges	  which	  may	  affect	  promotion	  prospects	  of	  individual	  judges.	  Moreover,	  their	  powers	  
are	   curtailed	   by	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   Ruling	   Board,	   which	   has	   most	   decision-­‐making	  
                                            
183	  See	  Art.	  21a	  Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz	  (German	  Constitutional	  Law	  on	  Courts).	  
184	  See	  Judgment	  of	  the	  German	  Federal	  Administrative	  Court	  of	  28	  November	  1975	  (BVerGE	  50,	  11	  =	  NJW	  1976,	  
1224).	  
185	   Johannes	  Riedel,	  Recruitment,	  Professional	  Evaluation	  and	  Career	  of	   Judges	  and	  Prosecutors	   in	  Germany,	   In,	  
RECRUITMENT,	  PROFESSIONAL	  EVALUATION	  AND	  CAREER	  OF	  JUDGES	  AND	  PROSECUTORS	   IN	  EUROPE	  (Giuseppe	  Di	  Federico	  ed.,	  
IRSIG-­‐CNR	  2005)	  69–126,	  at	  98–107.	  	  
186	  Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  Constitutional	  Guarantees	  of	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  Germany,	  in	  RECENT	  TRENDS	  IN	  GERMAN	  
AND	  EUROPEAN	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LAW	  	  267,	  at	  271	  (Eibe	  H.	  Riedel	  &	  Rüdiger	  Wolfrum	  eds.,	  2006).	  
187	  Levitt,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  197–198;	  and	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  502.	  
188	  Mak,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
189	  See	  Gutan,	  supra	  note	  67;	  and	  Iancu,	  supra	  note	  67,	  at	  594–596.	  
190	  See	  Gutan,	  supra	  note	  67.	  Note	  that	  the	  mandate	  of	  court	  presidents	  shall	  be	  prolonged	  to	  four	  years.	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powers.191	   Thus,	   court	   presidents	   are	   designed	   more	   as	   “administrators	   of	   the	   courts	  
rather	  than	  actual	  leaders”.192	  	  	  
	  
Italy	  and	  Ireland	  also	  seem	  to	  belong	  to	  this	  type,	  even	  though	  their	  court	  presidents	  are	  a	  
bit	   stronger	   than	   their	   Romanian,	   German	   and	   Dutch	   counterparts.	   Italian	   court	  
presidents,	  beyond	  standard	  administrative	  tasks,	  participate	   in	  the	  process	  of	  evaluating	  
judges	  and	  have	  retained	  some	  influence	  over	  allocation	  of	  cases.193	  Irish	  court	  presidents	  
also	  play	  an	   important	  role	   in	  disposal	  and	  allocation	  of	  cases	  and	  setting	  the	  policy,	  but	  
they	   have	   only	   limited	   powers	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   colleagues	   on	   the	   bench.	   This	   internal	  
independence	  of	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  judges	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  court	  presidents	  is	  further	  buttressed	  by	  “a	  
very	  strong	  cultural	  conception	  of	  individual	  judicial	  independence,	  which	  has	  traditionally	  
overshadowed	   corporate	   or	   collective	   judicial	   independence”,194	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   Irish	  
judges	   are	   not	   socialized	   within	   the	   judiciary	   and	   instead	   join	   the	   bench	   as	   already	  
successful	   leading	   figures	   of	   the	   Bar	   and	   other	   legal	   professions.	   However,	   Irish	   court	  
presidents	  have	  a	  say	  in	  selection	  of	  new	  judges	  and	  their	  last-­‐minute	  fightback	  in	  the	  Irish	  
parliament	   against	   the	  2018	   judicial	   reform	   that	   could	   limit	   their	   role	   in	   this	   area	   shows	  
their	  strength.195	  	  
	  
In	   the	   second	   type,	   the	   “boss”,	   a	   court	   president	   decides	  on	   case	   assignment,	   evaluates	  
judges	   of	   her	   court	   and	   has	   significant	   influence	   over	   their	   promotion,	   decides	   when	  
judges	  should	  be	  disciplined,	  influences	  well-­‐being	  of	  judges	  through	  various	  discretionary	  
perks	   such	   as	   vacation	   packages,	   help	   in	   obtaining	   apartments	   or	   getting	   children	   into	  
schools	   or	   nurseries,	   operates	   as	   a	   power	   broker	  with	   local	   or	   national	   political	   leaders,	  
and	  is	  usually	  active	  in	  the	  media	  and	  as	  ambassador	  of	  a	  given	  court.	  This	  model	  exists	  in	  
Russia196	  and	  many	  post-­‐Soviet	  states.197	  As	  Solomon	  has	  pointed	  out,	  “[t]he	  chair	  of	   the	  
court	   in	   Russia	   is	   and	   remains	   a	   ‘boss’,	   a	   super	   authority	  who	  manages	   his	   domain	   and	  
                                            
191	  See	  Gutan,	  supra	  note	  67.	  
192	  See	  Gutan,	  supra	  note	  67.	  
193	  Benvenuti	  &	  Paris,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
194	  O’Brien,	  supra	  note	  70.	  
195	  See	  Michael	  O’Regan,	  Judicial	  appointments	  Bill	  passes	  in	  Dáil	  and	  now	  goes	  to	  Seanad,	  THE	  IRISH	  TIMES	  (May	  31,	  
2018),	   https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/oireachtas/judicial-­‐appointments-­‐bill-­‐passes-­‐in-­‐d%C3%A1il-­‐
and-­‐now-­‐goes-­‐to-­‐seanad-­‐1.3515540?mode=amp.	  
196	  See	  Solomon	  2010,	  above	  note	  41;	  Solomon	  2012,	  supra	  note	  41;	  and	  Schwartz	  &	  Sykiainen,	  supra	  note	  36,	  in	  
particular	  at	  995-­‐996,	  1003,	  1008–1009,	  1012,	  1018–1027	  and	  1031–1034;	  and	  Popova,	  supra	  note	  41.	  	  
197	  See	  Müller,	   supra	   note	  41,	   at	   965	   (on	  Ukraine,	  Moldova,	  Armenia,	  Azaerbaijan	   and	  Belarus);	   Popova,	   supra	  
note	  41	  (on	  Ukraine);	  and	  Alexei	  Trochev,	  Patronal	  politics,	   judicial	  networks	  and	  collective	  judicial	  autonomy	  in	  
post-­‐Soviet	  Ukraine,	  39	  INTERNATIONAL	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  REVIEW	  662	  (2018),	  at	  670–674.	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represents	   the	   court	   in	   the	   outside	   world,	   including	   in	   informal	   dealings	   with	   local	  
authorities,	  whose	  support	  still	  matters	  for	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  court”.198	  	  
	  
These	  two	  types	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  continuum.	  Most	  European	  judiciaries	  
covered	   by	   this	   study	   lie	   somewhere	   in	   between	   these	   two	   poles.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   of	  
Czechia,	  Slovenia,	  the	  CJEU,	  Poland,	  Slovakia,	  the	  ECtHR,	  and	  France.	  Within	  this	  group	  we	  
can	  trace	  three	  configurations	  of	  powers	  that	  result	  in	  the	  following	  three	  tentative	  types	  –	  
the	  judicial	  leader	  type	  (Czechia,	  Slovenia,	  the	  CJEU),	  the	  judicial	  diplomat	  type	  (the	  ECtHR)	  
and	  the	  manager	  type	  (Poland,	  Slovakia	  and	  France).	  	  
	  
The	   court	   president	   as	   a	   judicial	   leader	   is	   not	   as	   strong	   as	   Russian	   court	   presidents,	  
because	   he	   is	   not	   a	   boss	   who	   may	   to	   a	   great	   extent	   affect	   well-­‐being	   of	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	  
judges.	  However,	  she	  still	  has	  not	  only	  broad	  ambassadorial	  and	  media	  power,	  but	  also	  has	  
a	  major	  say	  in	  case	  assignment	  and	  panel	  composition	  (administrative	  power).	  In	  addition,	  
she	  usually	  wields	  significant	  jurisprudential	  power	  through	  setting	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  debate,	  
opinion	  assignment	  and	  shaping	   the	   law	  (the	  CJEU	  and	  Czechia)	  and	  often	  has	  major	  say	  
over	   judicial	   careers,	   either	   in	   selecting	  and	  disciplining	   (Czechia)	  or	   in	  promoting	   judges	  
(Slovenia).	  
	  	  
The	   court	   president	   as	   a	   manager	   combines	   weak	   ambassadorial,	   media	   and	   financial	  
powers	  with	  at	  least	  intermediate	  power	  over	  allocation	  of	  cases,	  important	  say	  in	  careers	  
of	   individual	   judges	   and	   strong	   jurisprudential	   power.	   Therefore,	   managers	   tend	   to	   be	  
strong	  regarding	  the	   internal	  powers	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  colleagues	  on	  their	  court,	  but	  are	   less	  
active	   in	   external	   relations.	   The	   typical	   examples	   of	   this	   type	   are	   Poland	   and	   Slovakia.	  
France	   comes	   close	   too,	   but	   French	   court	   presidents	   seem	   to	   have	   less	   jurisprudential	  
power	  than	  their	  Polish	  and	  Slovak	  colleagues.	  
	  
In	  contrast,	   the	  court	  president	  as	  a	   judicial	  diplomat	  has	  weak	  power	  over	  the	  career	  of	  
her	  colleagues	  and	  their	  well-­‐being	  and	  little	  influence	  on	  allocation	  of	  cases,	  but	  he	  wields	  
significant	  power	  over	   the	  staff	  of	  her	  court	  and	  has	  extensive	  ambassadorial	  and	  media	  
power	   as	   well	   as	   intermediate	   jurisprudential	   power.	   The	   limited	   financial	   power	   and	  
power	  over	   judicial	  careers	  distinguishes	   this	   type	   from	  the	   judicial	   leader	   type,	   the	  boss	  
type	   as	   well	   as	   from	   the	   managerial	   type.	   However,	   her	   ambassadorial,	   media	   and	  
jurisprudential	  power	  sets	  judicial	  diplomat	  apart	  from	  the	  primus	  inter	  pares	  type.	  Out	  of	  
our	  13	  jurisdictions,	  only	  the	  ECtHR	  President	  fits	  this	  type.	  Her	  power	  lies	  primarily	  in	  her	  
“diplomatic	  missions”	   to	   the	   domestic	   courts	   and	  parliaments.	   her	   broad	  media	   activity,	  
her	  formal	  authority	  to	  wield	  power	  over	  the	  Registrar	  and	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  ECtHR,	  the	  fact	  
that	  she	  sits	  automatically	  at	  the	  Grand	  Chamber	  formations,	  in	  having	  informal	  influence	  
in	  choosing	  the	  cases	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  pilot	  judgments,	  and	  in	  acting	  as	  a	  power	  broker	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  Ibid.,	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  Solomon,	  supra	  note	  41.	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between	  the	  different	  Sections	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  with	  regard	  to	  referrals	  of	  cases	  to	  the	  Grand	  
Chamber.199	  
	  
II.	  Weak	  Court	  Presidents	  in	  Western	  Europe	  vs.	  Strong	  Court	  Presidents	  in	  Eastern	  Europe:	  
A	  Seductive	  but	  False	  Simplification	  
	  
In	   the	   Court	   Presidents	   Power	   Index	   we	   categorized	   court	   presidents	   in	   13	   European	  
jurisdictions	  according	  to	  how	  strong	  they	  are	  and	  identified	  five	  types	  of	  court	  presidents.	  
In	  this	  subsection	  we	  build	  on	  this	  categorization	  and	  revisit	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  
West/East	  division	  regarding	  the	  roles	  of	  court	  presidents	  in	  Europe.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  we	  
analyze	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  position	  corresponds	  to	  our	  findings	  regarding	  each	  component	  
of	  court	  presidents’	  power	  as	  well	  as	  regarding	  the	  overall	  strength	  of	  court	  presidents.	  
	  
The	   standard	   account	   in	   the	   literature	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   a	   huge	  divide	   between	   the	  
powers	   of	   court	   presidents	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   court	   presidents	   in	  
Western	   Europe	  on	   the	  other.200	   This	   claim	  also	   implicitly	   conveys	   the	  message	   that	   the	  
power	  of	  court	  presidents	   in	  each	  part	  of	  Europe	   is	  relatively	  uniform.	  Regarding	  Eastern	  
Europe,	  Kosař	  has	  argued	  that	  court	  presidents	  are	  invisible	  masters	  of	  the	  CEE	  judiciaries	  
irrespective	   of	   the	  model	   of	   court	   administration	   in	   place,201	   even	   though	   their	   powers	  
may	  in	  some	  countries	  be	  rather	  fragile.202	  This	  is	  so	  because	  “[t]hey	  are	  the	  key	  principals	  
of	  individual	  judges	  […,]	  have	  the	  best	  overview	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  within	  the	  judiciary	  […,	  
and	  t]hey	  can	  use	  the	  most	  important	  stick	  in	  the	  civil	  law	  judiciaries	  (disciplinary	  motion)	  
and	   have	   a	   major	   say	   in	   the	   most	   important	   carrot	   (promotion	   of	   judges)”.203	   In	   other	  
words,	   information	   asymmetry	   and	   political	   capital	   further	   buttress	   their	   formal	   and	  
informal	  powers.	  Other	  authors	  writing	  on	  courts	  in	  the	  CEE	  concur.204	  
	  
In	   contrast,	   the	   strength	   and	   importance	   of	   court	   presidents	   in	   CEE	   which	  make	   up	   an	  
important	   part	   of	   the	   discourse	   on	   the	   CEE	   judiciaries	   “appear	   alien	   to	   jurists	   in	   many	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  Çalı	  &	  Cunningham,	  supra	  note	  29.	  
 
200	  See	  supra	  note	  60.	  
201	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  390–398.	  
202	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  110–114.	  
203	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  390.	  
204	   See	   e.g.	   Bobek,	   supra	   note	   35,	   at	   253–254	   (on	   Czechia);	   or	   Piana,	   supra	   note	   37,	   at	   43–44	   (on	   Czechia,	  
Hungary,	  Poland,	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania);	  Solomon,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  354	  (on	  Russia);	  Müller,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  
965	  (Ukraine,	  Moldova,	  Armenia,	  Azaerbaijan	  and	  Belarus);	  Schwartz	  &	  Sykiainen,	  supra	  note	  36,	  in	  particular	  at	  
995–996,	  1003,	  1008–1009,	  1012,	  1018–1027	  and	  1031–1034	  (on	  Russia);	  and,	  on	  Slovakia,	  Alexander	  Bröstl,	  At	  
the	  Crossroads	  on	  the	  Way	  to	  an	  Independent	  Slovak	  Judiciary,	  In	  SYSTEMS	  OF	  JUSTICE	  IN	  TRANSITION:	  CENTRAL	  EUROPEAN	  
EXPERIENCES	  SINCE	  1989	  (Jiří	  Přibáň,	  Pauline	  Roberts	  &	  James	  Young	  eds.,	  2003)	  at	  141,	  143.	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Western	  Member	  States”.205	  According	  to	  this	  account,	  even	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Germany	  
in	   which	   court	   presidents	   wielded	   historically	   broad	   powers,	   they	   have	   undergone	  
significant	   transformation	   and	   lost	   most	   of	   their	   powers.206	   Some	   commentators	   even	  
suggested	   that,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   these	   changes,	   German	   court	   presidents	   “have	   lost	   the	  
capacity	  to	  give	  instructions	  to	  rank	  and	  file	  judges	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  particular	  cases	  …	  
and	  …	   come	   closer	   to	   the	   common	   law	  model	   of	  primus	   inter	   pares	   than	   the	   dominant	  
figure	   (boss)	   normally	   associated	   with	   court	   heads	   in	   the	   civil	   law	   world”.207	   Other	  
established	   democracies	   in	   Western	   Europe	   likewise	   reduced	   the	   role	   of	   hierarchical	  
oversight	   within	   their	   judiciaries	   over	   the	   past	   50	   years	   and	   changed	   the	   role	   of	   court	  
presidents	   profoundly.208	   The	   only	   area	   where	   Western	   European	   court	   presidents,	  
according	   to	   this	   account,	   seem	   to	  have	   retained	   some	  of	   their	   former	  power	  over	   rank	  
and	  file	  judges	  is	  the	  promotion	  of	  judges.209	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  existing	  literature	  suggests	  that	  court	  presidents	  are	  strong	  players	  in	  
Eastern	   Europe,	   whereas	   in	   Western	   Europe	   they	   have	   become	   rather	   representative	  
figures.	  However,	  both	  our	  Court	  Presidents	  Power	  Index	  and	  the	  several	  contributions	  to	  
this	  special	  issue	  challenge	  this	  view.	  Most	  importantly,	  Romanian	  court	  presidents	  do	  not	  
fit	  into	  this	  simple	  dichotomy	  as	  they	  rank	  among	  the	  weakest	  in	  our	  set	  of	  13	  jurisdictions.	  
They	   operate	   as	   “first	   among	   equals”,	   similarly	   to	   court	   presidents	   in	  Germany,	   and	   the	  
Netherlands.	   They	   are	   weaker	   than	   their	   counterparts	   in	   Italy,	   Ireland	   and	   France.	  
Conversely,	  French	  court	  presidents	  have	  still	  retained	  significant	  powers	  as	  they	  not	  only	  
have	   major	   influence	   on	   allocation	   of	   cases,	   but	   also	   have	   their	   say	   in	   selection	   and	  
promotion	  of	  judges.	  Moreover,	  if	  we	  add	  the	  CJEU’s	  President	  into	  the	  picture,	  the	  power	  
of	   court	   presidents	   in	   many	   CEE	   countries	   look	   relatively	   meager.	   In	   fact,	   the	   CJEU’s	  
President	  ranks	  among	  the	  strongest	  in	  Europe	  and	  is	  a	  true	  judicial	  leader.	  He	  not	  only	  has	  
extensive	   jurisprudential,	   ambassadorial	   and	   media	   power,	   but	   also	   enjoys	   significant	  
discretion	  in	  case	  assignment	  and	  through	  determining	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Article	  255	  
Panel	  also	   influences	  selection	  of	  new	  CJEU’s	   judges.	   If	  we	   leave	  Russia	  aside,	  only	  Czech	  
court	  presidents	  are	  arguably	  stronger.	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  Wallerman,	  supra	  note	  60,	  at	  676–677.	  
206	  See	  Riedel,	  supra	  note	  185,	  at	  69,	  98–107;	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  186,	  at	  267,	  271;	  Solomon,	  supra	  note	  41;	  
Levitt,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  197–198;	  and	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  502	  (these	  two	  authors	  suggest	  that	  judges	  
who	   seek	   promotion	   may	   be	   tempted	   to	   adjust	   their	   decision-­‐making	   according	   to	   the	   views	   of	   their	   court	  
presidents).	  
207	  Solomon,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  918.	  	  
208	  Anja	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  Judicial	   Independence	  –	  The	  Normativity	  of	  an	  Evolving	  Transnational	  Principle,	   In	  Seibert-­‐
Fohr,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  1279,	  1329.	  
209	  See	   Levitt,	  supra	  note	  82,	  at	  197–198	  (on	  Germany);	  and	  Seibert-­‐Fohr,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  502	   (on	  Germany);	  
Garapon	  &	  Epineuse,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  285–286	  (on	  France).	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In	   fact,	  when	  we	   look	  at	  our	  Court	  Presidents	  Power	   Index	  without	  any	  bias,	  we	  can	  see	  
that	  while	  court	  presidents	  in	  some	  CEE	  countries	  are	  on	  the	  upper	  side	  of	  the	  continuum,	  
it	   is	  difficult	   to	  draw	   the	  easy	   line	  along	   the	  West/East	  axis.	   Importantly,	  Romanian	  case	  
study	  shows	  that	  strong	  court	  presidents	  are	  not	  an	  inherent	  feature	  of	  all	  CEE	  judiciaries	  
and	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   reduce	   the	   power	   court	   presidents	   in	   the	   CEE	   context.	   What	  
emerges	   clearly	   is	   a	   more	   complex	   picture:	   even	   though	   Western	   European	   court	  
presidents	  are	  in	  general	  weaker	  than	  their	  Eastern	  European	  counterparts	  (with	  exception	  
of	  Romania),	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  diverge	  within	  Western	  Europe	  as	  well	  as	  within	  
Eastern	   Europe.	  What	   is	  more,	   powers	   of	   court	   presidents	   differ	   also	   between	   the	  CJEU	  
and	  the	  ECtHR.	  Put	  differently,	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  court	  presidents	  
in	   Europe,	   neither	   on	   the	   domestic	   nor	   on	   the	   transnational	   level.	   To	  make	   things	   even	  
more	   complicated,	   powers	   of	   court	   presidents	   do	   not	   automatically	   translate	   into	   their	  
influence,	  which	  is	  dependent	  on	  various	  contingent	  circumstances.	  We	  will	  analyze	  these	  
contingent	  circumstances	  in	  the	  next	  Part.	  
	  
D.	  Powers	  Do	  Not	  Automatically	  Translate	  into	  Influence:	  Contingent	  Circumstances	  Can	  
Make	  the	  Difference	  
	  
In	  the	  previous	  two	  Parts	  we	  categorized	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents,	  developed	  the	  Court	  
Presidents	  Power	  Index	  and	  identified	  the	  five	  types	  of	  court	  presidents.	  In	  this	  Part	  we	  will	  
problematize	   this	   index	   and	   show	   that	   powers	   are	   not	   necessarily	   the	   only	   factor	   that	  
determines	  the	  influence	  of	  court	  presidents.	  We	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  other	  determinants	  
that	  may	  restrain	  or	  bolster	  the	  utilization	  of	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents.	  We	  refer	  to	  these	  
additional	  determinants	  as	  the	  contingent	  circumstances	  of	  court	  presidents’	  power.	  These	  
contingent	  circumstances	   include	  the	  length	  of	  term	  of	  court	  presidents,	  the	  existence	  of	  
information	  asymmetry,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  the	  existence	  of	  competing	  bodies,	  
the	   role	   of	   individuals,	   the	   proximity	   of	   court	   presidents	   to	   political	   leaders,	   and	   the	  
influence	  of	  the	  legal	  profession,	  legal	  culture,	  and	  political	  environment.	  	  
	  
The	  existence	  of	  these	  contingent	  circumstances	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  Court	  Presidents	  
Power	   Index	   is	   to	  a	   large	  extent	   irrelevant	   (and	  we	   certainly	  do	  not	  want	   to	   convey	   this	  
message),	  and	  that	  it	  all	  depends	  on,	  for	  instance,	  legal	  culture	  or	  who	  holds	  this	  office.	  To	  
the	   contrary,	   this	   index	   still	   matters,	   because	   the	   interaction	   between	   powers	   of	   court	  
presidents	  and	  contingent	  circumstances	   is	  mutual.	   For	   instance,	   the	   scope	  of	  powers	  of	  
court	  presidents	  also	  shapes	  legal	  culture	  and	  determines	  what	  type	  of	  judges	  seek	  to	  hold	  
this	  office.	  It	  is	  thus	  important	  to	  keep	  this	  interaction	  in	  mind	  when	  analyzing	  contingent	  
circumstances	  in	  individual	  jurisdictions.	  
	  
First,	   the	   longer	   the	   term	   of	   court	   presidents,	   the	  more	   power	   they	   arguably	  wield.	   The	  
long	   term	   of	   office	   allows	   the	   court	   president	   to	   leave	   a	   greater	   imprint	   on	   the	   law,	   to	  
master	   all	   her	   competences,	   to	   develop	   a	   deeper	   knowledge	   of	   judges	   of	   her	   court,	   to	  
expand	   her	   networks,	   to	   foster	   her	   relationship	   with	   the	   media,	   and	   to	   increase	   her	  
ambassadorial	  activities.	  Especially	   if	   the	  term	  of	  a	  court	  president	  significantly	  surpasses	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the	   term	   of	   office	   of	   the	   members	   of	   the	   legislature	   and	   the	   executive,	   she	   may	   be	  
particularly	   valued	   for	  her	   institutional	  memory	  and	  politicians	  may	  be	   forced	   to	   rely	  on	  
her	  knowledge	  in	  personal	  decisions	  within	  the	  judiciary.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  governments	  
that	  intend	  to	  curtail	  the	  role	  of	  court	  presidents	  try	  to	  limit	  their	  term	  in	  office.	  This	  can	  
be	   done	   formally	   as	  well	   as	   informally.	   For	   instance,	   the	   Czech	   Parliament	   introduced	   a	  
non-­‐renewable	   term210	   for	   court	   presidents	   in	   2008	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   their	   influence	  
within	  the	  Czech	  judiciary.211	  	  
	  
A	  more	  intriguing	  technique	  is	  to	  select	  court	  presidents	  from	  among	  judges	  whose	  age	  is	  
close	  to	  a	  compulsory	  retirement	  age.212	  In	  contrast	  the	  most	  blatant	  technique	  is	  dismissal	  
of	   “unwanted”	   court	   presidents.213	   Finally,	   sometimes	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   length	   of	   a	  
court	   president’s	   term	   is	   just	   an	   unintended	   consequence	   of	   a	   judicial	   reform	   aimed	  
primarily	  at	  something	  else.	  This	  might	  be	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ECtHR,	  where	  the	  introduction	  of	  
a	  non-­‐renewable	  nine-­‐year	  term	  for	  Strasbourg	  judges	  in	  2010	  also	  shortened	  the	  potential	  
length	   of	   term	   of	   the	   ECtHR’s	   President.	   Put	   differently,	   no	   one	   can	   become	   such	   a	  
towering	   figure	   like	   Rolv	   Ryssdal,	   who	   presided	   over	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court	   for	   13	   years	  
(1985-­‐1998),	   or	   Luzius	   Wildhaber,	   who	   led	   the	   ECtHR	   from	   1998	   to	   2007.214	   This	  
institutional	   change,	   brought	   about	  by	  Protocol	  No.	   14,	   thus	   arguably	  made	   the	   ECtHR’s	  
presidents	  de	  facto	  weaker	  than	  their	  counterparts	  at	  the	  CJEU,	  where	  a	  renewable	  term	  
for	  judges	  is	  still	  allowed.215	  
	  
The	   second	   factor,	   information	   asymmetry,	   is	   closely	   connected	   with	   this	   one.	   Wide	  
information	  asymmetry	  can	  significantly	  boost	  court	  presidents’	  powers,	  as	  they	  are	  much	  
closer	  to	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  may	  be	  forced,	  however	  
reluctantly,	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  knowledge	  in	  making	  the	  policy	  as	  well	  as	  personal	  decisions	  on	  
the	   judiciary.216	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   enhanced	   transparency	   may	   limit	   court	   presidents’	  
discretion	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  powers,	  as	  it	  increases	  public	  control	  and	  may	  even	  result	  
in	  holding	  court	  presidents	  to	  account	  for	  their	  actions.217	  
                                            
210	  The	  term	  ranges	  from	  seven	  to	  ten	  years,	  depending	  on	  the	  tier	  of	  the	  Czech	  judiciary.	  
211	  See	  e.	  g.	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  11;	  and	  Blisa,	  Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
212	  This	  is	  a	  common	  practice	  (at	  least	  for	  apex	  courts)	  in	  Japan;	  see	  David	  S.	  Law,	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Conservative	  
Court:	  Judicial	  Review	  in	  Japan,	  87	  TEXAS	  LAW	  REVIEW	  1545	  (2009).	  	  
213	  See	  notes	  1–17.	  
214	   In	   fact,	   none	   of	   Wildhaber’s	   successors	   (Jean-­‐Paul	   Costa,	   Nicholas	   Bratza,	   Dean	   Spielmann,	   and	   Guido	  
Raimundi)	  presided	  over	  the	  ECtHR	  for	  more	  than	  5	  years	  (and	  usually	  much	  less).	  
215	  Note	  that	  Gil	  Carlos	  Rodríguez	  Iglesias	  held	  the	  office	  of	  the	  CJEU	  President	  for	  9	  years	  (1994–2003),	  Vassilios	  
Skouris	  for	  13	  years	  (2003–2015),	  and	  Koen	  Lenaerts	  has	  been	  the	  CJEU’s	  President	  since	  2015.	  
216	  This	  has	  happened	  in	  Czechia.	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  11;	  and	  Blisa,	  Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
217	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  Slovakia.	  See	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  77.	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The	  next	  two	  factors	  concern	  institutional	  design	  issues.	  The	  third	  factor	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  
the	  judiciary.	  One	  may	  argue	  that	  the	  strictly	  hierarchical	  judiciary	  with	  few	  appellate	  and	  
apex	   court	   presidents	  makes	   them	   stronger	   than	   the	   flat	   structure	  with	  multiple	   special	  
courts.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Slovak	  judiciary	  that	  resembles	  a	  simple	  pyramidal	  shape	  of	  three	  
court	   tiers	   (district	   courts,	   regional	   courts	   and	   one	   Supreme	   Court)218	   with	   no	   special	  
courts219	   increases	   the	   role	   of	   court	   presidents.	   Similarly,	   the	   Czech	   judicial	   system	   also	  
follows	  a	  hierarchical	  pattern,	  but	   it	  consists	  of	   four	  tiers	   (district	  courts,	   regional	  courts,	  
high	   courts,	   the	  Supreme	  Court)	   and	   features	  a	   specialized	  apex	   court	   for	  administrative	  
law	  matters,	   the	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court.220	  The	  structure	  of	   the	  Slovenian	   judicial	  
system	  is	  also	  relatively	  hierarchical,	  but	  it	  arguably	  dilutes	  the	  power	  of	  court	  presidents	  
even	  more	  than	  in	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  as	  Slovenia	  has	  not	  only	  a	  four-­‐tiered	  judicial	  system	  
and	  the	  separate	  Administrative	  Court,	  but	  also	  specialized	  labor	  and	  social	  courts	  and	  the	  
Court	   of	   Audit.221	   But	   that	   is	   nothing	   in	   contrast	   to	   judiciaries	   in	   the	   established	  
democracies	  covered	  by	  this	  special	  issue.	  Ireland’s	  judiciary	  consists	  of	  five	  tiers	  of	  general	  
courts	  and	  a	  plethora	  of	  special	  tribunals.	  France	  is	  well-­‐known	  for	   its	  convoluted	  judicial	  
system	   and	   the	   two-­‐headed	   judiciary,	   in	   which	   criminal	   and	   civil	   judges	   (magistrates)	  
follow	  a	  different	  path	  than	  the	  administrative	  tribunals	  headed	  by	  the	  Conseil	  d’État.222	  In	  
Germany,	  only	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  are	  there	  as	  many	  as	  five	  separate	  judiciaries	  with	  their	  
own	   apex	   court	   (Bundesgerichtshof,	   Bundesverwaltungsgericht,	   Bundesarbeitsgericht,	  
Bundesfinanzhof,	   Bundessozialgericht).223	   In	   addition,	   Germany	   also	   created	   a	   federal	  
patents	   court,	   the	   Bundespatentgericht,	   and	   special	   disciplinary	   courts.224	   Such	   a	   flat	  
structure	  inevitably	  reduced	  the	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  who	  are	  just	  one	  among	  many.	  
	  
The	   fourth	   factor	   that	   emerges	   from	   this	   special	   issue	   clearly	   is	   the	   existence	   of	   other	  
competing	  JSG	  bodies	  such	  as	  judicial	  councils	  or	  judicial	  appointment	  commissions.	  It	  is	  no	  
surprise	  that	  (leaving	  aside	  Russia)	  court	  presidents	  wield	  the	  strongest	  power	  in	  Czechia,	  
                                            
218	  See	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  77;	  and	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  254–264.	  
219	  Note	  that	  there	  is	  the	  Specialized	  Criminal	  Court,	  established	  in	  2009,	  but	  it	  operates	  in	  a	  very	  similar	  way	  as	  
the	  general	  criminal	  courts	  and	  its	  judgments	  can	  be	  appealed	  to	  the	  Slovak	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  
220	  See	  Blisa,	  Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  89;	  and	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  181–187.	  
221	  See	  Avbelj,	  supra	  note	  76.	  
222	  See	  Vauchez,	  supra	  note	  78;	  Garapon	  &	  Epineuse,	  supra	  note	  78;	  SERGE	  GUINCHARD,	  GABRIEL	  MONTAGNIER,	  ANDRÉ	  
VARINARD	  &	  THIERRY	  DEBARD,	   INSTITUTIONS	   JUDICIAIRES	   (2013);	  BENOÎT	  GARNOT,	  HISTOIRE	  DE	  LA	   JUSTICE.	  FRANCE,	  XVIE–XXIE	  
SIÉCLE	  (2009);	  and	  BRUNO	  LATOUR,	  THE	  MAKING	  OF	  LAW:	  AN	  ETHNOGRAPHY	  OF	  THE	  CONSEIL	  D’ETAT	  (2010).	  
223	  See	  FABIAN	  WITTRECK,	  DIE	  VERWALTUNG	  DER	  DRITTEN	  GEWALT	  (2006);	  WERNER	  HEUN,	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  OF	  GERMANY:	  A	  
CONTEXTUAL	  ANALYSIS	  (2011),	  at	  166–167;	  Wittreck,	  supra	  note	  92.	  
224	  See	  ibid.	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where	  no	  such	  competing	  body	  exists.225	  In	  contrast,	  in	  all	  five	  countries	  on	  the	  other	  side	  
of	   the	   Court	   Presidents	   Power	   Index	   (Germany,	   Ireland,	   Italy,	   the	   Netherlands,	   and	  
Romania)226	  court	  presidents	  have	  to	  compete	  for	  power	  in	  an	  increasingly	  crowded	  space.	  
In	   Italy	   and	   Romania	   court	   presidents	   face	   a	   strong	   judicial	   council,	   which	   has	   over	   the	  
years	   taken	   away	   some	   of	   their	   powers	   and	   weakened	   hierarchical	   supervision	   more	  
generally.227	   In	  the	  Netherlands	  court	  presidents	  have	  to	   interact	  with	  the	  three-­‐member	  
Management	  Board	  established	  at	  every	  court	  of	  first	  instance	  and	  court	  of	  appeal	  as	  well	  
as	   with	   the	   nation-­‐wide	   Council	   for	   the	   Judiciary.228	   In	   Ireland	   court	   presidents	   have	   to	  
guard	   their	   powers	   against	   the	   Court	   Service,	   the	   Judicial	   Appointments	   Advisory	   Board	  
(from	  2018	   to	  be	   replaced	  by	   the	   Judicial	  Appointments	  Commission),	  and	   soon	  perhaps	  
also	  against	  a	  judicial	  council.229	  The	  German	  contribution	  then	  shows	  that	  the	  powers	  of	  
court	  presidents	  can	  be	  diluted	  even	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  nation-­‐wide	  JSG	  body	  such	  as	  a	  
judicial	  council,	  a	  courts	  service,	  or	  a	   judicial	  appointments	  board.	  While	  the	   influence	  of	  
court	   presidents	   varies	   from	  one	   Land	   to	   another,	   each	  of	   them	   faces	   a	   plethora	  of	   JSG	  
bodies	   on	   the	   court	   level	   (Presidia)	   as	   well	   as	   on	   the	   Land	   level	   (Councils	   of	   Judges,	  
Councils	   of	   Judicial	   Appointment,	   Service	   Courts,	   and	   Committees	   for	   Selection	   of	  
Judges).230	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	   institutional	   factors,	  we	   should	   not	   forget	   that	   individuals	  matter	   too.	  While	  
this	  article	  is	  primarily	  about	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  court	  president,	  individuals	  holding	  this	  
office	  may	  significantly	  affect	  the	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  this	  institution,	  which	  in	  turn	  
determines	  real	   influence	  of	  court	  presidents	   in	  a	  given	   jurisdiction.231	  This	   is	  particularly	  
true	   for	   the	  Chief	   Justices.	  More	   specifically,	   an	   individual	  Chief	   Justice	  may	   transfer	  her	  
authority	  and	   legitimacy	   to	  an	   institution	  of	   the	  Chief	   Justice.	   The	   typical	   example	   is	   the	  
President	   of	   the	   CJEU	   Koen	   Lenaerts,	   who	   has	   been	   a	   prolific	   scholar	   and	   has	   been	  
considered	   as	   one	   of	   the	   intellectual	   leaders	   in	   the	   field	   of	   EU	   law,	   is	   a	   skillful	   judicial	  
                                            
225	  See	  Blisa,	  Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
226	  See	  Part	  C.I.	  
227	  See	  Benvenuti	  &	  Paris,	  supra	  note	  89;	  CARLO	  GUARNIERI	  &	  PATRIZIA	  PEDERZOLI,	  THE	  POWER	  OF	  JUDGES:	  A	  COMPARATIVE	  
STUDY	  OF	  COURTS	  AND	  DEMOCRACY	   (2002),	  at	  54–55;	  or	  Carlo	  Guarnieri,	  Judicial	   Independence	   in	  Europe:	  Threat	  or	  
Resource	  for	  Democracy?,	  49	  REPRESENTATION	  347	  (2013),	  at	  348	  (all	  on	  Italy);	  and	  Gutan,	  supra	  note	  67;	  and	  Iancu,	  
supra	  note	  67,	  at	  594–596	  (both	  on	  Romania).	  
228	  Mak,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
229	  O’Brien,	  supra	  note	  70.	  However,	   the	  proposed	   Judicial	  Council	  will	  be	  chaired	  by	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  and	   it	   is	  
unlikely	  (at	   least	   in	  the	  short	  term)	  that	  the	  fairly	  consensual	  approach	  that	  has	  been	  taken	  by	  successive	  Chief	  
Justices	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Courts	   Service	  would	   not	   also	   be	   carried	   through	   into	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   Judicial	  
Council.	  
230	  Wittreck,	  supra	  note	  92.	  
231	  We	  are	  grateful	  for	  this	  insight	  to	  Julio	  Ríos-­‐Figueroa.	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diplomat	   and	   is	   well-­‐connected	   not	   only	  within	   the	   EU	   institutions	   but	   also	  within	   legal	  
academia,	  speaks	  several	  other	  languages	  beyond	  French	  and	  English,	  and	  is	  well-­‐regarded	  
by	  legal	  community	  both	  in	  Europe	  and	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic.232	  Beyond	  Europe	  
the	   Canadian	   Chief	   Justice	   Beverley	  McLachlin233	   and	   the	   Pakistani	   Chief	   Justice	   Iftikhar	  
Chaudhry234	   have	   arguably	   achieved	   the	   same	   status.	   Such	   Chief	   Justices	   can	   use	   their	  
gravitas	  to	  increase	  their	  visibility	  and	  influence	  within	  their	  legal	  systems.	  The	  downside	  is	  
that	   once	   these	   towering	   figures	   step	   down,	   some	   of	   their	   individual	   authority	   and	  
legitimacy	  might	  go	  away	  too	  and	  the	  new	  Chief	  Justice	  might	  be	  much	  less	  influential.235	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   we	  must	   not	   forget	   that	   individual	   Chief	   Justice	   may	   also	   erode	   the	  
authority	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.	  Here	  the	  Slovak	  Chief	  Justice	  
Štefan	  Harabin236	  and	   the	  Chief	   Justice	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	   the	  United	  States	  Roger	  
Taney237	   come	   to	   mind.	   The	   Slovak	   contribution	   to	   this	   special	   issue	   also	   shows	   how	  
difficult	  it	  is	  to	  restore	  the	  lost	  reputation	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice.238	  	  
	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  sixth	  factor,	  the	  proximity	  of	  court	  presidents	  to	  political	  leaders.	  Court	  
presidents	  who	  belong	  to	  the	  social	  milieu	  of	   the	  political	  elite	  have	  better	  access	  to	  key	  
stakeholders	   and	  may	  use	   this	   lobbying	   capacity	   to	   resist,	   initiate,	   adopt	   and	   implement	  
judicial	   (and	   legal	   reforms)	   and	   counter-­‐reforms.	   In	   several	   countries	   judges	   can	   be	  
temporarily	   assigned	   to	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	   and	   other	   state	   organs,239	   which	   allows	  
them	   to	   use	   these	   contacts	   later	   on	   once	   they	   become	   court	   presidents.	   Many	   CEE	  
countries	  witnessed	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   “superjudges”.240	  By	  a	   “superjudge”	  we	  mean	  a	  
professional	   judge	  who	  at	  some	  point	  of	  her	  career	  became	  the	  minister	  or	  vice-­‐minister	  
and	  then	  returned	  to	  the	  judiciary.	  The	  sequence	  is	  important.	  A	  “superjudge”	  had	  been	  a	  
judge	  before	  she	   joined	  the	  executive	  and	  then	  returned	  to	  the	   judiciary,	  empowered	  by	  
all	   the	  knowledge	  and	   contacts	   she	  made	  within	   the	  executive	  branch.	  As	   shown	  above,	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233	   See	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   Legacy	   of	   Beverley	  McLachlin,	   Chief	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   of	   Canada;	   and	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David,	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  142.	  
234	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  notes	  22	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  244.	  
235	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  of	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  successors	  extremely	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236	  See	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  320–321,	  327–329;	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  Dred	  Scott	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  U.S.	  (19	  How.)	  
393	  (1857)),	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  that	  African	  Americans	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  not	  be	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  not	  prohibit	  
slavery	  in	  the	  territories	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  For	  further	  details,	  see	  DON	  E.	  FEHRENBACHER,	  THE	  DRED	  SCOTT	  CASE:	  ITS	  
SIGNIFICANCE	  IN	  AMERICAN	  LAW	  AND	  POLITICS	  (2001).	  	  
238	  See	  Spáč,	  Šipulová	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  77.	  
239	  This	  is	  a	  standard	  practice	  in	  Austria,	  Germany	  and	  France	  (for	  Conseillers	  d’État).	  
240	  For	  further	  details,	  see	  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  173–176,	  248–250.	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such	  “travelling	  among	  branches”	  is	  not	  specific	  to	  CEE.	  However,	  for	  historical	  reasons	  this	  
practice	   is	   particularly	   troubling	   in	   post-­‐communist	   judicial	   systems.241	   In	   semi-­‐
authoritarian	   regimes	   proximity	   to	   political	   leaders	   plays	   even	   greater	   role,	   since	   being	  
integrated	  in	  the	  ruling	  patronal	  network	  or	  the	  ruling	  family	  brings	  about	  more	  perks	  and	  
might	  be	  crucial	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  survival	  of	  court	  presidents.242	  
	  
The	   final	   set	   of	   factors	   involves	   a	   broader	   legal	   and	   political	   background.	   The	   varying	  
influence	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  is	  the	  seventh	  factor.	  Especially	  in	  common	  law	  countries,	  
where	   the	   connection	   between	   the	   bench	   and	   the	   Bar	   is	   particularly	   strong,	   the	   legal	  
profession	   may	   empower	   as	   well	   as	   constrain	   court	   presidents.	   Typically,	   the	   legal	  
profession	  may	  play	  a	  gate-­‐keeping	  role	  and	  its	  structure	  may	  affect	  judicial	  selection.243	  At	  
the	   same	   time,	   lawyers	   may	   mobilize	   the	   people	   against	   political	   attack	   on	   court	  
presidents.	  We	  saw	  this	  most	  clearly	  in	  Pakistan	  after	  General	  Pervez	  Musharaff	  suspended	  
Chief	   Justice	   Iftikhar	   Chaudhry.244	   However,	   even	   in	   Poland	   some	  members	   of	   the	   legal	  
profession	  have	  come	  out	  strongly	  against	  the	  Law	  and	  Justice	  Party’s	  attempt	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  
the	  Polish	  Supreme	  Court	  President,	  Małgorzata	  Gersdorf.245	  	  
	  
The	  eighth	   factor	   is	   legal	   culture,	  which	   is	  even	  more	  deeply	  embedded	   than	   the	   role	  of	  
the	   legal	   profession.	   Most	   importantly,	   despite	   the	   growing	   convergence	   between	   the	  
“career”	   and	   “recognition”	   judiciaries,246	   they	   still	   produce	   different	   types	   of	   identity	  
within	  the	  judiciary.	  Distinctive	  features	  of	  both	  models	  are	  well-­‐known.247	  Here	  it	  suffices	  
to	  say	  that	  career	  judges	  who	  enter	  the	  judiciary	  at	  a	  relatively	  young	  age	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  
the	  judicial	  hierarchy	  and	  become	  fully	  socialized	  within	  the	  judicial	  ranks	  are	  more	  prone	  
to	  deferring	  to	  court	  presidents	  than	  judges	   in	  recognition	   judiciaries	  who	  join	  the	  bench	  
no	   sooner	   than	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   their	   careers	   with	   life	   wisdom	   and	   experience	   gained	  
outside	  the	  judiciary.248	  Put	  differently,	  career	  judiciaries	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  hierarchical	  and	  
tend	   to	   deny	   individual	   identity	   to	   judges,	   whereas	   the	   recognition	   judiciaries	   largely	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  Lizzie	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  Kate	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  in	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   SCH.	  
ROUNDTABLE	  205	  (2000);	  or	  Nuno	  Garoupa	  &	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  Hybrid	  Judicial	  Career	  Structures:	  Reputation	  Versus	  
Legal	  Tradition,	  3	  JOURNAL	  OF	  LEGAL	  ANALYSIS	  411	  (2011).	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  See	  supra	  notes	  52	  and	  146.	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  Kosař,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  113–120.	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revolve	   around	   the	   notion	   of	   individuality.249	   This	   explains	   that	   court	   presidents	   are	   not	  
considered	   “superiors”	   of	   other	   judges	   in	   recognition	  models.	   In	   contrast,	   hierarchical250	  
judiciaries	  tend	  to	  leave	  more	  room	  for	  maneuver	  to	  court	  presidents.	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   political	   culture	   makes	   a	   difference	   too.	   For	   instance,	   while	   politicians	   in	  
Western	  Europe	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  dismissal	  of	  a	  court	  president	  as	  a	  legitimate	  strategy,	  
their	   counterparts	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   resort	   to	   this	  measure	   quite	   often.251	   At	   the	   same	  
time,	   court	   presidents	   in	  Western	   Europe	   who	   commit	   problematic	   acts	   tend	   to	   resign	  
voluntarily	   amid	   the	   pressure	   from	   their	   peers	   and	   political	   culture.	   In	   contrast,	   court	  
presidents	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  in	  similar	  situation	  tend	  to	  fight	  until	  the	  bitter	  end.	  252	  Finally,	  
political	  environment	  which	   is	  hostile	  to	   judges,	  such	  as	  the	  recent	  situation	   in	  Poland,253	  
inevitably	   puts	   court	   presidents	   under	   heavy	   pressure,	   because	   they	   are	   viewed	   as	  
representatives	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  thus	  they	  easily	  end	  up	  in	  a	  direct	  conflict	  with	  political	  
leaders.	  
	  
To	  sum	  up,	  the	  fact	  that	  court	  presidents	  have	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  powers	  discussed	  in	  Part	  
B	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  they	  can	  and	  will	  use	  all	  of	  these	  powers	  in	  practice	  and	  
that	  they	  can	  and	  will	  stretch	  them	  to	  their	  limits.	  Put	  differently,	  powers	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  
faculty	  do	  not	  necessarily	  translate	   into	  power	   in	  the	  meaning	  of	   influence.	  This	  depends	  
on	  several	  contingent	  circumstances	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  quantify.	  This	  does	  not	  undermine	  
the	   Court	   Presidents	   Power	   Index,	   but	  merely	   suggests	   that	   a	   complete	   account	   of	   how	  
court	  presidents	  maintain	  their	  power	  can	  be	  adequately	  presented	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  
particular	   jurisdiction	   and	   only	   with	   deep	   knowledge	   of	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   given	  
judiciary,	  both	  in	  the	  de	  iure	  and	  de	  facto	  dimensions,	  and	  accounting	  for	  the	  political	  and	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E.	  Conclusion	  
	  
This	   article	   showed	   the	   multiple	   roles	   court	   presidents	   play	   in	   domestic	   as	   well	   as	  
transnational	   judiciaries.	  They	  may	  wield	  broad	  powers,	  ranging	  from	  power	  over	   judicial	  
careers	  of	   their	   colleagues	  on	   the	  bench,	   case	  assignment,	   and	   jurisprudential	  power,	   to	  
financial	   power,	   ambassadorial	   and	   media	   power.	   We	   also	   analyzed	   13	   European	  
jurisdictions	  and	  ranked	  their	  court	  presidents	  according	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  power.	  This	  
resulted	   in	   the	   Court	   Presidents	   Power	   Index,	   first	   of	   its	   kind,	   which	   showed	   various	  
configurations	  of	   court	  presidents’	   powers	   and	  allowed	  us	   to	   identify	   five	   types	  of	   court	  
presidents:	  court	  president	  as	  a	  boss,	  court	  president	  as	  a	   judicial	   leader,	  court	  president	  
as	  a	  manager,	  court	  president	  as	  a	  judicial	  diplomat,	  and	  court	  president	  as	  a	  primus	  inter	  
pares.	  Our	  index	  also	  forces	  us	  to	  rethink	  the	  traditional	  view	  that	  Eastern	  European	  court	  
presidents	   are	   much	   stronger	   than	   their	   counterparts	   in	   Western	   Europe,	   since	   the	  
West/East	  division	  regarding	  the	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  is	  not	  as	  clear	  as	  presented	  in	  
the	  existing	  literature.	  
	  
We	  also	   identified	  several	  promising	  avenues	   for	   further	  research.	  First,	  we	  need	  to	  take	  
stock	  of	  other	  jurisdictions	  and	  work	  more	  on	  the	  types	  of	  court	  presidents,	  both	  in	  Europe	  
and	   beyond.	   Second,	   further	   research	   should	   distinguish	   between	   different	   tiers	   of	   the	  
judiciary	   in	  which	  court	  presidents	  operate.	  We	  should	  probably	  single	  out	  Chief	  Justices,	  
as	   they	   have	   unique	   position.	   It	   is	   also	   clear	   that	   the	   powers	   of	   presidents	   of	   appellate	  
courts	  may	   differ	   from	   the	   powers	   of	   presidents	   of	   lower	   courts.	   To	   add	   to	   complexity,	  
apex	  court	  presidents	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  more	  influence	  than	  other	  court	  presidents.	  
For	   instance,	   in	   Czechia	   regional	   court	   presidents	   arguably	   wield	   more	   power	   than	   the	  
President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court.254	  
We	   need	   to	   understand	   how	   this	   has	   happened	   and	   under	   what	   circumstances	   such	  
phenomenon	  persists.	  
	  
The	  contributions	  to	  this	  special	  issue	  also	  showed	  that	  court	  presidents	  play	  a	  major	  role	  
in	   judicial	   politics	   and	   thus	   it	   is	   particularly	   interesting	   to	   explore	   how	   they	   react	   to	   the	  
introduction	   of	   a	   new	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	   body.	   Under	  what	   circumstances	   do	   they	  
resist	  such	  reform?	  If	  the	  resistance	  does	  not	  succeed,	  do	  they	  embrace	  the	  new	  JSG	  body	  
or	  do	  they	  try	  to	  weaken,	  contest	  or	  even	  capture	  it?	  Under	  what	  circumstances	  they	  may	  
succeed	   and	   what	   techniques	   they	   use	   to	   achieve	   that	   end?	  We	  may	   also	   inquire	   how	  
court	   presidents	   interact	   with	   other	   bodies	   involved	   in	   judicial	   governance	   and	   with	  
politicians.	  In	  fact,	  political	  contestation	  between	  court	  presidents	  and	  political	  leaders	  has	  
been	  quite	   common	   recently.255	   The	  ongoing	   conflict	  between	   the	  Polish	  Supreme	  Court	  
President,	  Małgorzata	  Gersdorf,	  and	  Law	  and	  Justice	  Government	  has	  even	  become	  one	  of	  
the	  key	  issues	  in	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  	  	  
                                            
254	  See	  Blisa,	  Papoušková	  &	  Urbániková,	  supra	  note	  89.	  
255	  See	  notes	  1–17.	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This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  next	  important	  question:	  Are	  there	  some	  powers	  of	  court	  presidents	  
that	   are	   more	   prone	   to	   political	   attack?	   We	   may	   also	   rephrase	   this	   question	   and	   ask	  
whether	  a	  particular	   type	  of	  court	  presidents	   is	  more	  susceptible	   to	  political	  backlash.	   In	  
order	  to	  answer	  these	  two	  questions,	  we	  first	  need	  to	  understand	  why	  politicians	  want	  to	  
get	   rid	   of	   ‘problematic’	   court	   presidents.	   Do	   they	   want	   to	   improve	   efficiency	   and	  
leadership,	   change	   the	  perception	  of	   the	  given	  court	  by	   the	  public	  or	   incrementally	   shift	  
the	   course	   of	   law?	  Or	   they	   just	   need	   to	   have	   sufficient	   and	   reliable	   information	  what	   is	  
going	   on	   in	   the	   judiciary?	   Or	   do	   they	   rather	   intend	   to	   silence	   or	   side-­‐line	   their	   critics,	  
suppress	   judicial	   dissent,	   pave	   the	  way	   for	   bringing	   in	  more	   loyal	   personnel,	   and	   ensure	  
that	   the	   courts	  will	   yield	   judgments	   favoring	   the	   ruling	   political	   elite?	   In	   the	  worst	   case	  
scenario,	   do	   politicians	   want	   to	   use	   court	   presidents	   as	   transmission	   belts256	   to	   openly	  
advance	  their	  agenda?	  This	  approach	  has	  an	  important	  advantage	  for	  the	  ruthless	  political	  
leaders	  –	  by	  “outsourcing”	   judicial	   interferences	   to	  court	  presidents,	  political	   leaders	  can	  
easily	   protect	   themselves	   from	   criticism	   for	   direct	   meddling	   with	   the	   judiciary,	   because	  
using	  court	  presidents	   to	  advance	   their	  agenda	   is	  more	  opaque	   than	  purging	   the	   judicial	  
corps	  or	  using	  coercion.257	  	  
	  
The	   attempts	   of	   taming	   ‘recalcitrant’	   court	   presidents	   in	   Hungary,	   Poland,	   Slovakia	   and	  
Ukraine258	  also	  bring	   to	   the	   fore	  what	  can	  be	  done	   to	  prevent	   this	   from	  happening	  or	  at	  
least	   to	  minimize	   the	   incentives	   to	  meddle	  with	  selection	  and	  dismissal	  court	  presidents.	  
One	   policy	   implication	   comes	   to	   mind	   immediately	   –	   to	   go	   normative	   and	   reduce	   the	  
powers	   of	   court	   presidents,	   especially	   in	   post-­‐communist	   countries.	   To	   be	   sure,	   it	   is	   a	  
simple	  and	  seductive	  solution.	  However,	  is	  it	  the	  right	  path?	  If	  we	  take	  away	  some	  power	  
from	   court	   presidents,	   this	   power	  does	  not	   disappear.	   It	  will	   be	   transferred	   to	   someone	  
else.	  Therefore,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  think	  twice	  whom	  should	  we	  transfer	  this	  power	  to	  and	  
whether	   such	   transferal	   would	   not	  make	   things	   even	   worse.	  Moreover,	   we	   also	   have	   a	  
potential	   counterfactual,	   since	   Romania’s	   judiciary	   does	   not	   fare	   well,259	   despite	   having	  
relatively	  weak	  court	  presidents.260	  
	  
There	   are	   simply	   many	   pressing	   questions	   and	   few	   answers.	   In	   order	   to	   answer	   these	  
questions,	  we	  need	   to	  broaden	  our	  horizons	  and	  analyze	   judicial	   self-­‐governance	   from	  a	  
                                            
256	  On	  the	  transmission	  belt	  metaphor,	  see	  note	  123.	  
257	   Alexei	   Trochev,	   Judicial	   Clientelism	   in	   Kazakhstan,	   (unpublished	  manuscript,	   on	   file	   with	   authors).	   See	   also	  
notes	  18–19.	  
258	  See	  notes	  1–17.	  
259	  See	  Gutan,	  supra	  note	  67;	  and	  Iancu,	  supra	  note	  67,	  at	  594–596.	  
260	  See	  ibid;	  and	  Part	  C.	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more	   holistic	   view	   and	   look	   beyond	   traditional	   suspects	   such	   as	   judicial	   councils	   and	  
judicial	   appointment	   committees.	   Only	   then	   we	   may	   come	   closer	   to	   understanding	   the	  
place	  of	  court	  presidents	  in	  the	  puzzle	  of	  judicial	  governance.	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